MAPPING OF THE VIOLENCE IN THE AMAZON REGION: FINAL REPORT
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MAPPING OF THE VIOLENCE IN THE AMAZON REGION: FINAL REPORT
The Brazilian Forum on Public Safety (FBSP), with support from the Institute for Climate and Society (ICS) and a partnership with researchers from the Research Group of Emerging Territories and Resistance Networks in the Amazon (TERRA), of the University of the State of Pará – UEPA, developed the project “Mapping of the Violence in the Amazon Region.” This aims, in summary, to cross-reference and analyze data regarding unlawful actions, criminality and public security in the Amazon with the socioenvironmental debate. The project integrates the idea that the Amazon is one of the main strategic assets of Brazil, which places it at the center of the geopolitical discussion of the global climate. It paves the way for a frank debate involving the connections and interfaces between some of the main problems of the region.

The main findings and conclusions were anticipated in a previous publication, which consisted of an executive summary launched at the time of COP26, in Glasgow, Scotland, and which is available at https://forumseguranca.org.br/publicacoes_posts/cartografias-das-violencias-na-regiao-amazonica/. Consequently, the idea here is to provide more detail and to expand the three central areas that guided the project. Connections will be drawn from the research findings and will contribute to the debate over land use in the Amazon from the perspective of public security and the multiple unlawful actions that overlap in the territory of the region. More than exhausting the subject, the project aims to discuss the intersections between the unlawful actions and the territory, in order to benefit from the accumulated knowledge that already exists in the socioenvironmental field and, at the same time, to demonstrate the limits and institutional capacities that exist in order to guarantee the law and the promotion of citizenship in the context of the preservation of the forest.

Therefore, the first chapter concerns the main environmental crimes in the Legal Amazon1, focusing on land grabbing, illegal fires, timber exploitation and, above all, in the artisanal mining and illegal

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1 The concept of Legal Amazon was established in 1953 and its territorial limits stem from the need to plan the region’s economic development and, therefore, are not limited to the jungle ecosystem. It currently encompasses all eight states (Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima and Tocantins) and part of the State of Maranhão.
mining that has been growing exponentially in the region in recent years. An attempt will be made to describe how these disputes over land use occur, which is essential in order to understand the complex phenomenon of the violence in the region.

In the second chapter, three sub-themes are linked with respect to the violence and organized crime in the Legal Amazon, namely: a) the diffusion of the organized crime and drug trafficking factions in the region; b) the environmental and land conflicts that produce lethal violence against the people directly involved in disputes over land use; and c) the intentional violent deaths in the Amazon. These three interconnected dimensions help to explain some of the produced indicators of violence, such as the increase in the mortality rates in the states of the region since the 2000s and the higher concentration of homicides in the deforested and non-forest areas, in accordance with the classification of Iamazon.

Finally, in a third topic, the dimension of the institutional structure of the security in the Amazon is considered. The central idea is to present how the various security, defense and justice institutions, which operate in the region at both the state and federal level, are important players in the conflicts over land use that are at the center, directly or indirectly, of the lethal violence that has been occurring in the Legal Amazon in recent years. Map representations of the military bases of the Armed Forces and Operations for the Guarantee of Law and Order are presented. Furthermore, some points with respect to the performance of the Federal Highway Police, the Civil Police and the Military Police in the region are incorporated, as well as data of the police manpower, both in absolute terms and in relation to the concentration of agents in proportion to the territorial extension.

In conjunction, the information indicates warning signs in the guarantee of justice and public security for those who live in the Legal Amazon, such as, for example, possible gaps in human resources, a lack of specific training for those working with the native people and an absence of integration between the different state bodies operating in the region. It is not by accident that the socioenvironmental debate needs to consider that the flourishing of the green economy includes a scope that is the strengthening of security as a fundamental right and compliance with the law. This is no longer in terms of the defense of the state, but in the promotion of citizenship for the population of the region. A large part of the destruction of the forest in the region is the result of illegal activities, which are fueled by complex national and transnational criminal chains that operate across different economies – from timber to minerals, through real estate speculation, the laundering of assets and other crimes such as the trafficking of people or wild animals.

Therefore, it is no longer feasible to speak in isolation of the threats to national sovereignty and/or the militarization of the region without beforehand connecting these aspects to the dynamics of the criminal governance of the territory and to the premises of the coordination of spheres of government and public policies for the construction of the social and environmental justice. On the one hand, focusing exclusively on the dimension of national defense excludes the risks of deterioration of the internal control of the territory by the state, at its multiple levels and branches. On the other hand, the numbers referring to the violence in the Amazon show that it makes no sense to separate urban and rural and/or city and forest. The phenomena are distinct but they are intrinsically interconnected to the dynamics of the territorial control by armed groups. The preservation of the Amazon involves the coordination of different instances and actors so that the public policies can take over the areas now occupied by organized crime.
Therefore, as will be seen in more detail in this report, the different modes of transport in the Amazon are used by organized crime and there is a territorial overlap of different unlawful actions and violence. Drug trafficking, deforestation, land grabbing or artisanal mining are the types of unlawful actions that, in the formal world, would demand the attention of different inspection and control agencies, including the police. However, they are not acting in an integrated manner and there are frictions existing between the federal and state agencies. It is not surprising that many of the points identified as the focus of environmental crimes are exactly in those locations/municipalities with the highest rates of intentional violent deaths. In the dispute over who has the legal jurisdiction to act in a given territory, what we are seeing is that gaps are being created through the lack of governance and coordination. The gaps have been used by the networks of unlawful actions that, very often, are connected and act in coordination.

In short, the findings of the project, as already anticipated in the Executive Summary, allowed us to formulate 3 arguments:

i) The intense presence of organized crime factions and the disputes between them over the national and transnational drug routes that cross the region contribute to the increase in the homicide rates/intentional violent deaths in the states, placing them above the national average. The deficits in the governance and structure of the public security apparatus, especially in its investigative capacity and justice leave the region hostage to the alliances and conflicts of the dynamics of organized crime and its overlaps and exchanges with environmental crimes;

ii) Between 2018 and 2020, the dynamics of the lethal violence in the Amazon region differentiated itself from the rest of the country, especially due to the accentuated internalization of the violence. There is a reduction of urban homicides at a more heightened pace than in the rest of Brazil. Simultaneously, the homicides in the rural and intermediary municipalities are increasing, while the homicides in these locations in the rest of the country are decreasing. This phenomenon points to the importance of the agrarian conflicts and environmental crimes, which coexist and intertwine in the territory with the dynamics of the criminal factions.

iii) In the Amazon municipalities under pressure from deforestation, we found the homicide rate higher than the national rates and those of the Legal Amazon region, reinforcing the previous argument. Consequently, the mere militarization and/or deployment of security forces from outside the region to meet specific demands is not only extremely expensive but also has little effect. It is necessary to invest in the strengthening of the integrated mechanisms of command and control that connect the federal and state spheres and, in particular, the different agencies and government branches (Civil Police, Military Police, public defenders, IBAMA, ICMBio and the judiciary, among others). To guarantee sovereignty and development, the logic that will allow the reduction of crimes and violence must be the construction of institutional capacities and not the militarized and temporary occupation of the territory.
CHAPTER 1: ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES IN THE LEGAL AMAZON

The association between the advance of deforestation and the intensification of the conflicts over land tenure and violence is not exactly new. Some factors, such as the expansion of agricultural frontiers, large infrastructure projects and livestock and cattle breeding activities have been identified as the drivers of the social degradation of certain territories. These forms of occupation of the forest are accompanied by environmental damage that results in conflicts over land use, the control of natural resources, the right to the titling and demarcation of the lands and, ultimately, the right to life itself. There is already extensive literature written on the subject and the proposal in this study is to retrieve some references that will allow us, secondly, to use data from the project in the extensive dialogue with respect to the interconnections and intersections between the different modalities and the types of violence and unlawful actions.
The Federal Constitution of 1988 guarantees, in article 225, an “ecologically balanced environment,” imposing on the Government the duty to defend and preserve it. One of the strategies for the compliance with this constitutional duty is the definition of territorial spaces over which greater levels of protection are applied.

Therefore, it is worth detailing the types of protected areas that will be cited in this document and used later in the spatial visualization of the analyzed phenomena.

a) Conservation Units (UCs): is a portion of the national territory or marine waters established by the municipal, state or federal government, as an area under a special regime of administration. There is recognition that the area has important natural characteristics that justify the special protection;\(^2\)

b) Indigenous Lands (TIs): the first paragraph, article 231, of the Federal Constitution, defines the lands traditionally occupied by Indians as those “permanently inhabited by them, those used for their productive activities, those essential for the preservation of the environmental resources necessary for their well-being and those required for their physical and cultural reproduction, according to their uses, customs and traditions.”

c) Quilombola Territories (TQs): in addition to resulting from the former quilombos of refugee slaves, some of the communities were established in lands arising from inheritances, donations, payments in exchange for services provided or the purchase of lands, both during the duration of the slave system and after its abolition.\(^3\)

The territorial policies for the official demarcation actions of these areas depend on the government and the states of the federation, in addition to the operation of bodies such as INCRA, FUNAI and the Palmares Cultural Foundation (FCP) and the institutions of state lands, which are responsible for carrying out the technical studies that arrange the demarcation, certification and titling of the lands.

In 2000, Law 9985 was created, according to which the states and municipalities can create new Conservation Units. This is because, in Brazil, these UCs are defined as areas with important relevance for the maintenance of the ecosystem. This Law also created the National System of Conservation Units (SNUC), determining rules that help the ordering of the Laws regarding the various categories of UCs.

Both the TIs and UCs constitute a barrier to the advance of the environmental degradation in the Amazon. The preserved areas contribute to the balance of the climate and the maintenance of the biodiversity. Adding to these, there are the Quilombola Territories occupied by people of African descent, who have been in the locations for centuries and reproduce their way of life and their ancestral ethnic identity. These forms of zoning in the Amazon region translate into a perspective of prevention of all forms of destruction of nature.

The following maps are spatial representations of the TIs, TQs and UCs in the Legal Amazon.

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\(^2\) Available at: https://uc.socioambiental.org/unidadesdeconservacao#territorios-indigenas

\(^3\) Available at: https://uc.socioambiental.org/unidadesdeconservacao#territorios-indigenas
MAP 1
Conservation Units in the Legal Amazon


MAP 2
Indigenous Territories and Quilombola Territories in the Legal Amazon

Amazonas and Pará have the largest concentration of Conservation Units and are also the states with the largest territorial dimension, with Amazonas being less integrated into the dynamics of the highways. In relation to TIs and TQs, Amazonas, Pará and Mato Grosso stand out. Amazonas has the largest concentration of indigenous lands and Pará has the most quilombola lands. In the case of TQs, the territorial dimension is much smaller when compared to TIs and UCs. This is because they depend on policies of reintegration of possession for the definitive title of the land, which requires the certification of the Palmares Cultural Foundation. This is a federal government agency that today has several certification processes at a standstill.

Currently, Brazil has 2,446 UCs throughout the country at the federal, state or municipal level. There are different types of units, which are classified according to their characteristics and the objectives to be achieved. These objectives are aimed at the sustainable use of the resources, the preservation of the ecosystem, the creation of environmental parks for sustainable tourism, the research environment and environmental education, etc. Considering only those located in the biome of the Amazon, there are 352 UCs, with most of them (73%) for sustainable use and public management (84%). According to the Socioenvironmental Institute, there are currently 725 TIs in Brazil, of which 424 are in the Legal Amazon. Finally, there are 175 TQs defined by INCRA, of which 34 are in the state of Pará and were registered by Pará Land Institutes (ITERPA) in 2019.

The TIs and UCs are essential for the preservation of the Amazon forest and its communities, as well as in the mitigation of climate change, functioning as a barrier against deforestation. Therefore, an important strategy for the containment of the unlawful environmental acts that will be analyzed below is the expansion of the territories defined as protected areas. The very idea of territory deserves to be highlighted, because it produces meaning for all the actions of life until death of a series of groups linked to the land, such as landholders, riverside dwellers, quilombolas, indigenous people, rubber tappers and environmentalists, among others.

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4 Painel Unidades de Conservação Brasileiras do Ministério do Meio Ambiente. Available at: https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=ejUjoiMjuwMTU1NwM0-DkyNcD0N3NlvWNTqW3vt3v723Zv78Cv0h3NwD7h3Y3v72t7GmgtMDAxZTINNGhh7MaZ7nM21N7INyJ9. Data collected on March 11, 2022.
5 Ibid.
6 https://pib.socioambiental.org/pt/Localiza%C3%A7%C3%BAo%e_extens%C3%A3o%das_ILs#:~:text=O%20Brasil%20tem%20uma%20extens%C3%A3o,s%C3%A3o%20reserved%20to%20people%20ir%C3%A3o%20indigenous%20people.
7 ISA. Terras Indígenas seguem barrando desmatamento, mas situação de algumas áreas é crítica. Published: December 7, 2017. Available at: https://terrasindigenas.org.br/pt-br/node/49
For the geographer Marcelo de Lopes Souza, the geographic space must be distinguished from the territory, which is “a space defined and delimited by and from relationships of power.” Therefore, it is understood that this “space of power” is defined not only from the operation of the state, but also from the self-government and other influences that are asked about the space. Consequently, the main question regarding how to characterize a space as territory would be: “who dominates, governs or influences whom in this space, and how?”

In the case of the Amazon, in order to understand the dynamics of the violence in the region, it is first necessary to review the main environmental crimes that involve the forest. This is because the unequal dispute between the actors involved in the illegal exploitation of the natural resources and the population that fights for the preservation of the territory establishes the social bases on which the criminal organizations and the actors involved with the criminality in the region interact.

Any type of damage caused to the elements of nature that comprise the environment are identified as environmental crimes and are demonstrated by the destruction of fauna and flora, the pollution of rivers and the destruction of biodiversity, among others. These are crimes regulated by Law 9605, dated February 12, 1998, known as the Law of Environmental Crimes. This establishes criminal and administrative sanctions derived from the conduct and activities that are harmful to the environment and other provisions.

Land grabbing, fires and timber exploitation

According to the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT), land grabbing is defined as any action that results in the taking or sale of the possession of lands that belong to the government, private owners or unoccupied lands, through the falsification of documents or direct actions, such as invasions, deforestation and fires, and threats and expulsions, among others. Recent research by International Transparency of Brazil indicated that land grabbing is carried out by corrupt and fraudulent processes, such as the bribing of the officials of the environmental agencies, the setting up of private militias to expel the landholders, the falsification of the regulatory processes and collusion with lawyers, brokers and registrars.
In summary, the cycle of the land grabbing can be divided into two connected phases, as follows:

a) the appropriation of land from illegal control;

b) the attribution of an appearance of legality, which is partly bureaucratic and seen as a facilitator for the registration of the land in a notary office.\(^{13}\)

Consequently, the felling of the forest becomes, on the one hand, the main moment of the invasion of the land, and, on the other hand, a strategy for the subsequent process of the “legalizing” of the land in the notary offices. What happens, therefore, is that the future perspective of land grabbing (the transformation of the illegally invaded land into legally designated land) drives the investment of the land grabber in the initial phase of the deforestation. The crime of deforestation, therefore, is subsequently consolidated with the receipt of the land title of the affected land.

Furthermore, the deforestation functions as a factor of the land price appreciation that can be worth more than 20 times in comparison with the land still covered by the forest.\(^{14}\) The arrival of major infrastructure works, such as road construction, for example, is also a factor in the intensification of this process and the heating up of the land grabbing market. There is, accordingly, an intimate relationship between land grabbing, deforestation and real estate speculation.

According to the document produced by the initiative Agro é fogo, deforestation has yet another function in the land grabbing cycle, i.e., the evidence of the actual occupation for the purpose of taking advantage of the public policies that, in practice, provide an amnesty to land grabbing. The Legal Land Program, created by Law 11952/2009, and amended by Law 13465/2017, for example, accepts the registration of the deforestation in satellite images as evidence for the dating of the occupation.

In this regard, it is worth highlighting that land grabbing in Brazil has been legalized since the 19th century, with legislation in 1850, 1931, 1964-1985 and, more recently, 2009 and 2017. The 21st century processes were consolidated with the Legal Land Program, of 2009, which was later amended, in 2017, by Law 13465, from Provisional Presidential Decree 759/2016, and which is the object of Bill 2633/2020, which is in progress in the Federal Senate. These landmarks play a fundamental role in the phenomenon of land grabbing in the Amazon, translating into the processes of transfer of public assets to the private domain and resulting in the so-called “globalization of Brazilian agriculture and the internationalization of the region.”\(^{15}\) It is important to emphasize that, between 2009 and 2020, approximately 190 million hectares of land went through the process of legal and national legalization by means of land grabbing, which was only made possible as a result of these legal landmarks.\(^{16}\)

Land grabbing generates very important social, environmental and economic impacts, including conflicts accompanied by threats, attempts at intimidation, extortion, assaults and murders. In a report produced

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\(^{13}\) ACUIAR, Diana; TORRES, Maurício. A boiada está passando: desmatar para grilar. Agro é Fogo. Available at: https://agroefogo.org.br/a-boiada-esta-passando-desmatar-para-grilar/.

\(^{14}\) Ibid.


\(^{16}\) Ibid.
by Transparency International,\textsuperscript{17} the main weaknesses that explain how land grabbing has been carried out with ease by criminal organizations were highlighted. They are: a) the precariousness of the property registrations; b) the deficiency in the digitization of property registrations; c) unoccupied lands; d) self-declaratory processes in registration systems; e) unrecognized legitimate occupations; f) lack of transparency in registrations; g) lack of integration of the registration and registry systems; h) deficits in the structure and capacity of the land and environmental agencies.

Some of the most common frauds or bribes used during the registration of false titles in the land grabbing schemes, according to the report,\textsuperscript{18} are registrations of fictitious properties in the respective systems; fraud in the certification of the georeferencing of a registered property; use of a false contract, deed, title or power of attorney; frauds in the registrations of properties; co-opting of professionals to facilitate frauds in real estate registrations; the sale of judicial decisions; insertion or validation of false data in registrations; and the undue prioritization of corrupt agents in the administrative processes.

In the phase of the invasion of the land,\textsuperscript{19} the operation of agents from the public security agencies is highlighted in the illegal practices such as threats or violence against the legitimate occupants of a property – in some cases through the constitution of private militias – in addition to omissions in actions of environmental inspection or the leaking of information about future inspections. Failing to curb or even encouraging land grabbing ends up contributing to the generalized increase of the violence in the Amazon region.

As already explained, one of the possible explanations for the cause of the fires is the search for the deforestation of the forest. After deforestation, the bureaucratic process of land grabbing proceeds. More broadly, therefore, the fires are understood as a forest or agropastoral practice in which the fire is used in a controlled manner, acting as a factor of production, so that there is an intentional and premeditated action.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Transparência Internacional – Brasil. Governança fundiária frágil, fraude e corrupção: um terreno fértil para a grilagem de terras, 2021. Available at: https://comunidade.transparenciainternacional.org.br/grilagem-de-terras, page 12.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Ibid., page 15.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid., page 19.
\end{itemize}
Fire is an agent of disturbance present in about 40% of the entire Legal Amazon region. According to Carrero and Alves (2016), its occurrence can be divided into three main types, according to its origin:

a) Fires for deforestation: they are intentional in origin, associated with the clearing and burning of the forest. In this situation, after the practice of deforestation (removal of the timber), the vegetation is cut down and left to dry in the sun. Only afterwards is fire used to burn the vegetation;

b) Fires in already deforested areas: these are also the result of intentional fire. They have the objective to eliminate the plants that grow with the natural regeneration of the area in use, such as weeds and pastures. They can be used as a way of preparing the soil for livestock production;

c) Creeping forest fires: they originate from uncontrolled fires that reach primary forests or forests that have already been exploited for timber extraction. Depending on the climate and the type of affected vegetation, the fires can penetrate large extensions of the forest (CARRERO; ALVES, pages 157-8).

Therefore, intentional fires have the objective to cut down the forest, but they can also be linked to the desire to exploit the timber itself, or to use the land for grazing cattle or for agricultural production. In this second situation, the fires are the result of pasture management, the burning of secondary forests and of residues from the timber exploitation. In the case of fires in already deforested areas, it is possible that these actions will not increase the rates of deforestation, because they are intended for the preparation of a previously deforested soil.

In general, therefore, there is a consensus among researchers on the subject that the agriculture and cattle breeding activities are the main motivators of the process of the fires, because they are activities that require large areas of land. Consequently, intentional fires are practices that are related to the deforestation, causing direct effects on climate change, as already widely proven by the researchers in the area.21

The maps below provide spatial representations of the impacts that the protected areas have been suffering from deforestation and fires. These are types of environmental crimes that are increasingly advancing towards the preserved areas of the forest and putting pressure on the UCs, TIs and TQs. Therefore, in addition to environmental problems, there are also social conflicts that involve the invasion of lands by loggers, artisanal miners and rural producers, as will be discussed later.

In addition to all the problems of a social, economic and cultural order that surround them, the fires also contribute to global warming, air pollution, the destruction of fauna and flora, the deterritorialization of traditional people and communities and the advancement of the frontiers of agribusiness. The trails of destruction that the fires have had on the region can be observed in the maps below.

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MAP 3
Outbreaks of fires in UCs in the Legal Amazon (2019)


MAP 4
Outbreaks of fires in TIs in the Legal Amazon (2019)

With respect to the fires in UCs registered by the National Institute for Space Research (INPE) in 2019 (Map 3), the states of Pará, Acre and Tocantins stand out, considering the count of information from official sources that are represented on the map. Considering the UCs divided into integral protection and sustainable use, the Triunfo do Xingu Environmental Protection Area (APA), in Pará, with 2,519 outbreaks is highlighted, the Chico Mendes Extractive Reserve (Resex), in Acre, with 1,820 occurrences and the Ilha do Bananal APA, in Tocantins, with 1,456 fires.

In relation to the fires in TIs (Map 4), Tocantins once again stands out, followed by Roraima and Mato Grosso. However, there are several diffuse outbreaks in the states of Pará, Amazonas, Acre and Maranhão. The intense concentration of the fires in the north portion of the state of Roraima also draws attention. The TIs with the highest incidence of outbreaks are the Parque do Araguaia (TO) with 2,895 outbreaks, Raposa Serra do Sol (RR) with 630 occurrences and Paresi (MT) with 464 fires. Another highlight is that in the case of Amapá, the registered fires were primarily concentrated in the indigenous areas. In 2019, the 461 TIs of the Legal Amazon had a total of 293,419 outbreaks of fires.

**Map 5**

*Outbreaks of fires in the Legal Amazon (2020)*

As demonstrated in the previous graph, 2004, 2005 and 2007 had the highest number of outbreaks of fires in the region. There was a decrease in 2008 and 2009, but, subsequently, there was an increase of fires in 2010. The period between 2011 and 2020 is marked by fluctuations in the registered number of outbreaks of fires, but at a lower level than between 2002 and 2007. The period between 2018 and 2020 seems to indicate a growth trend, which is yet to be confirmed with the data for the twelve months of 2021.

The fires are also directly related to timber exploitation which, when carried out in a predatory manner, severely damages the biodiversity, affecting the balance between the animal and plant species. The environmental impacts related to timber activity can be variable, due to the high number of methods that can be used in its exploitation, and there are also secondary impacts. The access to selected locations for the felling and hauling of the logs can be defined as one of these secondary impacts. Due to the exposure of the forest, there are indirect consequences involving its connection with the roads and navigable rivers. The rivers and roads function as important export corridors for the smuggled timber, meeting demands from the south and southeast regions of the country and the USA and Europe.

According to Veríssimo et al (2011), the greatest pressure exercised by the predatory timber activity takes place in UCs and TIs, even more so when considering the illegality of the exploitation in these territories. Map 6 enables the observation of the registrations of the seizure of illegal timber and the pressure on TIs and UCs between 2016-2020, indicating Amapá, Roraima, Pará and Amazonas as the locations with the highest concentration of seizures.

24 Veríssimo, 2011.
Registrations of the seizure of illegal timber in TIs and UCs (2016-2020)

From the collection of data from 2015 to 2020, from the public agencies responsible for the inspection and seizure of illegal timber in the Amazon region, the highway, river and maritime routes used by the criminal organizations who operate in the exploitation of the timber were identified. In general, the networks use the main federal and state highways of the region, taking advantage of their precarious traffic conditions, which makes inspections by the agencies more difficult.

In relation to the rivers, the circulation of illegal timber tends to use this means of distribution, generally at the exit point of the extraction areas to some municipality with access to a highway that can transship the cargo or where the timber can be processed and transformed from logs (in natural/raw volume) into sawn/processed wood. This transport of timber that uses the roads and rivers is also determined by the difficulties of creating alternative routes, given the immense obstacles of access to the region.

25 According to IBAMA (2020), the main notices of infringement in relation to seized timber are related to: transport that differs from the forest guide (GF), irregularities in the document of the forest origin, discrepancy in the volume and type of wood during the act of inspection, and wood originating from areas without authorization for deforestation.
In the analyzed period, the state of Pará is highlighted in relation to the quantity of municipalities with registrations of the seizure of timber and in the volume apprehended, located mainly in the mesoregions of the northeast of Pará, Marajó and the southwest of Pará. The municipalities of Itaituba and Santarém were the two that registered the highest values respectively in the entire Amazon, with 42,000 m³ and 100,000 m³ of timber seized, respectively, especially because they have large areas of public forests on the municipal boundaries. In addition to these, others stand out, such as Portel, Breves, Limoeiro do
Ajuru, Ulianópolis and Nova Esperança do Piriá. The first three are located in the estuary region of the Amazon River, where the timber extraction has been taking place for decades, and the circulation is by river up to some point on the BR 422 and PA 151, from where it is transported by trucks.

In Pará, the federal highways BR 230, BR 163, BR 010 and BR 155 are used, generally with exit points to other regions of Brazil, especially the northeast and southeast. The state highways are generally used to transport the timber from the extraction locations and/or to evade the inspections on the federal highways, especially the PA 370, PA 151, PA 256, PA 413 and PA 150. In relation to the ports, Vila do Conde and Santarém operate as export platforms to other countries, mainly the USA, Panama, South Korea, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates, among others.

The environmental areas most pressured by the timber smuggling in Pará,26 over the last five years, are the Cachoeira Seca Indigenous Territory, the Alto Rio Guamá TI, the Gurupi Biological Reserve, the Tapajós National Forest, the Jamanxim National Forest and Ipaú-Anilzinho Resex.

The state of Amazonas is currently in the new zone of expansion of timber smuggling, highlighting the municipalities of Lábrea, Apuí, Novo Aripuanã and Humaitá, in the mesoregion of south Amazonas. In addition to these, there were registrations of timber seizures in the municipalities of Atalaia do Norte and Benjamin Constant, in southwest Amazonas, close to the border with Peru; in the central region of the state of Amazonas, there were significant seizures in Manaus, in addition to the municipalities of Manicoré, Novo Airão, Codajás and Itacoatiara.

Most of the timber seized in Manaus is exported via the port of Manaus. In some cases, in addition to exporting the illegally extracted timber from Amazonas, timber from Roraima, Rondônia and Acre is sent through Manaus.

Before arriving in Manaus for export, the timber is transported by river, with an emphasis on the Solimões, Negro, Javari and Madeira rivers. By land, the most used federal highways are the BR 174 and BR 319, in addition to the state highways AM 010 and AM 352. The most impacted protected areas in the state were: Flonas do Aripuanã and Jamari, Tis Vale do Javari and Vale do Pirititi, in addition to the São Sebastião do Uatumã Sustainable Development Reserve (RDS).

In Rondônia, the municipalities of Porto Velho and Alto Paraíso are highlighted, a region called Ponta do Abunã, close to the border with Acre and south Amazonas, which is currently one of the areas of expansion of the agricultural and cattle breeding frontier in the Amazon. In the south region of the state, the largest registrations of seizures of illegal timber occurred in Vilhena and Oeste Marques, near the border with Mato Grosso.

In Rondônia, the illegal timber is transported mainly along the federal highway BR 364, and can be exported to the south and southeast regions of Brazil, passing through Mato Grosso, or towards Manaus, via the BR 174, where it will be exported. The most affected areas are: Karapuna TI and the Jacundá State Reserve.
In Mato Grosso, the municipalities that had the greatest seizure of illegal timber were Barra do Garças, Comodoro, Colniza, Rondolândia, Alta Floresta, Itiquira and Marcelândia, all with more than 1,000 m³ apprehended. The most used routes are the BR 364, BR 070 and BR 163, which head towards the south and southeast regions of Brazil. In addition to these two federal highways, other routes use the state highways MT 265 and MT 407.

In Roraima, the municipality that most registered the seizure of timber was Rorainópolis, with more than 3,000 m³ of processed wood. The most used route is via the BR 174 towards Manaus, where the timber is exported through the port of Manaus. The most impacted protected areas in the state are the National Forests of Roraima and Anauá and the Yanomamis and Pirititi TIs.

Acre did not register any large volumes of seizure of illegal timber in the period. The amount apprehended took place along the BR 364, near the Polo State Reserve. In addition to this reserve, the Chico Mendes Resex has been the target of smugglers of trees with a high commercial value, such as the Brazil nut and Ipê.

Amapá, despite being proportionally the most preserved state in forest areas, has been registering an increase in the seizure of timber by the inspection agencies. The municipality that registered the highest volume of illegal timber was Tartarugalzinho, with 1,255 m³ in the analyzed period.

The most used routes in Amapá are the federal highways BR 156 and BR 210, heading towards the ports of Santana and Macapá, from where they leave by river to Belém and then to the port of Vila do Conde, also in Pará. In some cases, the export may occur through the port of Santana. In relation to the areas where timber was most apprehended, the Amapá State Forest, the Cajari Resex, the Nova Canaã Settlement Project, Nova Colina and Munguba stand out.

The state of Maranhão had the highest registration of timber seizure in the municipality of Zé Doca, with 1,215 m³ of timber apprehended in the analyzed period. This fact is explained by the proximity of the Alto
Turiaçú, Caru and Awá TIs, of the Guajajara indigenous people. Over the years, they have been suffering the impact of the invasion of their lands by loggers who deforest in order to remove the timber illegally. In addition to these indigenous territories, another heavily impacted is the Araribóia TI, located more in the central region of the state. In order to preserve the forest and their territory, the indigenous people from these TIs have created surveillance groups called guardians of the forest, in order to contain the advance of the logging invaders.

The most used routes in Maranhão are the federal highways BR 316, BR 135, BR 230, BR 010 and BR 222. The routes head towards other states in the northeast region, such as Bahia, Pernambuco and Ceará, and also to the south and southeast regions of Brazil.

Tocantins registered few volumes of seized timber. The vast majority of the cargo comes from other states, such as Pará and Maranhão. It is seized in Tocantins due to some irregularity in the Forest Guide, volume or type being transported. The highways used as routes are the BR 153, BR 010 and TO 080, heading towards the southeast and south regions.

Assessing the history of the deforestation in the Legal Amazon provides important evidence for the analysis of the illegal exploitation of timber. The following graph, based on INPE data, refers to the reports of deforestation in the period from 2004 to 2020, allowing a comparative sample of the last 16 years of this activity. This phenomenon has always been maintained as a type of economic activity related to the practice of rural agriculture, to corporate agricultural production, to the opening up of the land for the production of pasture in order to allow cattle breeding and the actions of the timber industry.

**GRAPH 2**
Deforestation in the Legal Amazon in km² (2004 – 2020)

![Graph showing deforestation in the Legal Amazon from 2004 to 2020](image)

Source: INPE (2020).

It is possible to observe the oscillations of the graph. 2004 was the peak of deforestation in the Legal Amazon and from then onwards there is a decrease in these reports until 2012, when the lowest deforestation rate of this historical series is achieved. According to the study “Illegality and Violence in the Amazon,” produced by Amazônia 2030 and published in a recent report in the Revista Piauí,27 the significant drop of deforestation...
in the Amazon during this period was the result of a state that was capable of regulating, monitoring and punishing the activity. Technological development and satellite images were combined with an institutional framework that was capable of transforming the monitoring into punishment.

The rates remained practically stable until 2016, when the indices of deforestation intensified again, especially in 2020, which had the highest rate since 2012. This fact raised concerns regarding issues with respect to the environmental policies for the Amazon and the positioning of the federal government and the Ministry of the Environment in relation to this problem.

According to the 2019 INPE data, there was an increase in the deforestation rates in the Legal Amazon. The percentage indices in 2019 were higher than the previous year and 63.2% higher than in 2015. In 2020, in the first half of the year, the INPE indicated an increase of 25.6% over the same period when compared to 2019 (INPE, 2020). In relation to the deforestation of TIs in the Legal Amazon, of the 424 existing TIs, 270 were correspondingly affected. The indigenous lands are, therefore, in fact under threats that endanger the existence of these people.

Since the 1980s, when the National Development Program announced the Grande Carajás Program, mining has stood out not only as an important wealth generating activity, but also as an accumulation by spoliation that generates social inequalities and environmental imbalances. Among these mining practices (extraction of manganese, iron and bauxite, etc...) there is an emphasis on the extraction of gold, whose peak occurred during the 1980s in the municipality of Curionópolis, in the southwest of Pará, in the region known as Serra Pelada. This involved around 80,000 people and became the largest open-air mine in the world, closing down in 1992.

Almost thirty years later, the artisanal mining of gold is still a subject of conflicts. In the current context of the Amazon region, the activity generates conflicts between indigenous people, artisanal miners, environmentalists, public security forces and the criminal factions from organized crime. The disputes over artisanal mining have become more complex, because the indigenous lands are currently being invaded, the occupants are coerced and co-opted, and local politicians encourage the advance of the artisanal mining activity, building a front of resistance against the environmental and indigenous policies in the region.

Today, Pará is the state that concentrates the largest number of illegal artisanal mines, many of which are concentrated in the basin of the Tapajós River. The southwest of the state that has become the epicenter of artisanal mining in the Legal Amazon. It is an economic activity that has been spreading and poses a major threat to the ecological balance of the rivers and the forest. Another problem concerns the presence in Indigenous Lands and Conservation Units defined as Integral Protection Units, which are under threat from these activities.
Amazonas and Roraima also suffer from these artisanal mining actions that invade the Indigenous Lands and impose a logic of infringement on the rights of the original Munduruku, Kaiapó and Yanomami people. In addition to the deforestation and the craters that are opened and remain exposed, there is the use of mercury that contaminates the rivers, harming not only the indigenous people, but also the riverside population that feeds on the fish that have been contaminated. Therefore, it is understood that there is a scale that expands in the Amazon in relation to the impacts caused by the illegal artisanal mining as an ecological problem that threatens the health of the people of the forest. It is not limited to an exclusively indigenous issue.

Currently, there are 6.2 million hectares of TIs and UCs that are threatened by the search for gold. According to the DETER warning system, managed by the National Institute for Space Research (INPE), 72% of the artisanal mining practiced in the Amazon between January and April 2020 occurred within protected areas. According to a survey of the search requests for the exploitation of the metal carried out by the Instituto Escolhas, the number of requests in TIs has been increasing in recent years, with a record of 31 registrations in 2020, even with the practice of mining prohibited by the Federal Constitution, as established by articles 176 and 231, which require legal authorization for the activity.

In relation to the UCs, the growth of illegal gold extraction or evidence of irregularities has also increased. From 2019 to 2020, 21.5 tons of gold were extracted in these territories. Of the 13.8 t classified by the study of Manzolli et al (2021), 4.7 t were identified as illegal and 9.1 t as potentially illegal. In this regard, there is the possibility that the real origin of the ores referred to in the official data is masked by the process of the “legalizing” of the gold, which makes it possible for the illegal production from artisanal mines to be sold and exported as a legal product. Due to the absence of strict control by the responsible agencies, the illegal practice of the extraction of the gold results in social conflicts, such as money laundering from drug trafficking, land grabbing and corruption, as well as the destruction of environmental resources, deforestation and mercury pollution.

According to research carried out by the Instituto Escolhas in partnership with the Federal Universities of Ceará and Rio Grande do Norte, five years is the average period for the extraction of gold and diamonds to cause the deforestation of the municipalities in the Legal Amazon. In other words: a territory where gold and diamonds are extracted advances five years in its levels of deforested land. The statistical studies carried out, therefore, proved the increase of the deforestation attributed to only this activity, in isolation, after two years of exposure to artisanal mining, and ceasing to exist after seven years, if the activities are interrupted.

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28 DETER is a system for the rapid survey of warnings that evidence the alteration of the forest cover in the Amazon, performed by the INPE.
32 Ibid.
The raised issues support the idea that artisanal mining issue is not only an environmental problem, but also constitutes a public security and community health problem, so it must be understood as such by the governmental agendas of the Amazon states, and by the federal government. According to studies carried out by MapBiomas, the Legal Amazon concentrates 93.7% of the artisanal mining in Brazil. According to MapBiomas, between 1985 and 2020, of every four hectares mined in Brazil, three were in the Amazon. When the reference is the TIs and UCs, the data shows that from 2010 to 2020 the area occupied by artisanal mining in the indigenous areas grew by 495%. In the same period, the area occupied by artisanal mining in a Conservation Unit grew 301%, i.e., there was a very significant increase in activity.

The following map, in an enlarged scale of the Amazon region, identifies the areas that have been deforested by artisanal mining in UCs in Pará. It can be observed that there is a concentration in the southwest region of the state that involves precisely the basin of the Tapajós River, where artisanal mining practices have been developing and consolidating. These areas suffer drastic changes and compromise the biodiversity and the way of life of the forest people.

**MAP 8**

Area deforested by illegal artisanal mining in UCs in the Amazon (2020)

Therefore, there is action by artisanal miners in the south of the state, affecting the Rio Novo National Park, the Jamanxim National Forest and the Tapajós Environmental Protection Area. In the northwest region of the state, the artisanal mining reaches the Amana National Forest, the Alto Maués Ecological Station, the Tapajós Environmental Protection Area and the Urupadi National Forest. To the north of Itaituba, artisanal miners operate in the Itaituba Forest National and in the Jamanxim National Park. In Jacareacanga, there are artisanal miners in the Munduruku TI on the border with the municipality of Itaituba.

In relation to the illegal artisanal mining activities in the Amazon, the Raposa Serra do Sol TI is today one of the main areas of conflict involving artisanal miners and indigenous people. In addition to the IT, there is a UC represented by the Monte Roraima National Park, which also suffers from aggressions due to artisanal mining activities. It is possible to identify 15 points of operation of artisanal miners in the indigenous reserve and one point that is located in the UC. This region has for some time been characterized as an area of social, environmental and political conflicts that also involve the state.

The MapBiomas data highlights that the Kayapó, Munduruku and Yanomami TIs in Pará are the most affected by artisanal mining, with 7,602 ha, 1,502 ha and 414 ha, respectively, of lands that have suffered from its operations. This constitutes an environmental and ethnographic crime against indigenous people, because the sacred areas for these people are also incorporated into the economic dynamics of the mineral exploitation.

Another study that should also be taken into consideration in relation to artisanal mining in the Amazon is the research by the Amazon Network of Georeferenced Socioenvironmental Information (RAISG) consolidated in the report “Amazon plundered,” which presented the entry and exit routes of the mining, as well as the rivers that are negatively affected by the environmental impacts. According to the report, around 2,557 illegal artisanal mines were detected in the Pan-Amazon region, with the following distribution: 1,889 in Venezuela, 453 in Brazil, 134 in Peru and 68 in Ecuador. It is emphasized that there were also several points of artisanal mining that were not registered.

In any case, the different modalities presented in this section appear to be gaining traction and new characteristics from another parallel and associated phenomenon, which is the strengthening of the presence of organized crime in the Amazon and its role in the domination and organization of the territory. It has become the element that leads to and enhances several conflicts, dramatizing the struggle for the land and the standing forest. In the next section, therefore, special attention will be given to the main criminal organizations that operate in the region.

34 Available at: https://garimpoilegal.amazoniasocioambiental.org/story
To understand the crime situation in the Amazon, as in a good part of Brazil, a more precise notion is vital of what is "organized crime," which is much talked about but little understood. This concept has changed significantly in recent decades. From a vague notion shared by the police in some countries, it has become a recognized problem in most parts of the world and has slightly different definitions in several countries, in addition to a legal status. In Brazil, the subject is defined by Law 12850, dated August 2, 2013, as follows:

A criminal organization is considered to be the association of 4 (four) or more people structurally ordered and characterized by the division of tasks, even informally, with the objective of obtaining, directly or indirectly, an advantage of any nature, through the practice of criminal offenses whose maximum penalties are over 4 (four) years, or that are of a transnational nature.

Internationally, this criminal offense was defined in the Sicilian city of Palermo, where a conference on organized crime was held in December 2000. In the territory controlled by the most famous criminal organization, the Cosa Nostra, 124 participating countries signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. In it, it was agreed that criminal organizations would be those formed by “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”
In other words, the definition includes groups of three people, which according to Brazilian legislation would be considered as a simple gang. However, even the Brazilian legislation is not very informative because it does not explain very clearly which are the groups known by the press as “factions” or criminal organizations. Therefore, for the purpose of this work, we will consider these groupings of criminal organizations of a traditional nature, whose definition would be:

A group of people dedicated to unlawful and clandestine activities that has its own hierarchy and is capable of business planning, which includes the division of labor and profit planning. Its activities are based on the use of violence and intimidation, having as a source of profit the sale of unlawful merchandise or services, which is protected by sectors of the state. Its distinguishing characteristics from any other criminal group are a system of clientele, the imposition of the law of silence on members or people close to them, and the control by force of a certain portion of territory.35

Brazilian criminal organizations

A characteristic shared by most Brazilian criminal organizations, especially those that follow the traditional model, is that almost all of them began in prisons. Initially as a league, or a syndicate, of prisoners to subsequently become criminal organizations with external interests. The first of this model was, without a doubt, the Falange Vermelha, which later adopted the name of Comando Vermelho (CV). Almost twenty years after the Falange Vermelha creation, in 1994, the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) was started in São Paulo. These two organizations would dictate the course of the others in the 21st century. Because the history of both is well known, the idea in this text is only to detail their importance in the configuration of the organizations in Pará and in the Amazon in general.

Although both were created by bank robbers, they increasingly turned to drug trafficking as they grew, which shaped the way they are today. Without this drug trafficking, they would be smaller and less powerful outside the prisons, in addition to not having an important method of raising institutional and individual funds. Despite the apparent similarities, there is a marked difference between them: the degree of centralization of the power, both in their city and the state of origin and in the rest of the country.

The Comando Vermelho never had a monopoly on drug trafficking in Rio de Janeiro. Soon after its formation, other important criminal groups emerged, such as the Terceiro Comando, which fought for the space in the prisons and in drug trafficking. Currently, the control of crime in Rio involves at least three distinct groups: Comando Vermelho, Terceiro Comando Puro and the Militias. After 2006, the PCC obtained hegemony inside and outside the São Paulo prisons. With respect to the centrality of the command, while the latter has a group

that varies between ten and fourteen members who command nationally, the so-called Sintonia Final, in the CV most of the leaders are local. Even in Rio de Janeiro, the leaders from different regions have significant independence. At the national level, even more so. For example, in Mato Grosso, the main organization is the CV/MT, which is in fact allied to the Rio de Janeiro faction, but is not obedient to them.

With different organization models, the two factions forged an alliance throughout the 2000s. Manso and Dias (2018) state that, in 2002, the PCC already had nationalization as its objective, which at that time intended to be carried out through an alliance with the Comando Vermelho (CV). In that period, the PCC already had control of prisons in two other states, namely Paraná and Mato Grosso do Sul, which were strategic locations, being border states and important routes for the entry of illegal drugs, especially those destined for the southeast region. The dominion in these two states was only possible thanks to the prison policy adopted by the government of São Paulo between 1998 and 2002, which transferred members linked to the faction to prisons in other states in an attempt to put an end to rebellions.

It was to respond to the demand of states like São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, which had suffered from recurrent prison rebellions and orchestrated attacks on the streets, that the federal government inaugurated, in 2006, the first prison unit of the Federal Penitentiary System. The federal penitentiaries differ from the state prisons in that they hold a maximum of 208 inmates, all in individual cells, and with a very rigid system with cameras scattered throughout the establishment, only 2 hours of daily sunbathing and no electricity in the cells.

If the measure may have supported the states with the transfers of the leaders of the criminal factions, it also had the unexpected effect of connecting and interlinking individuals and criminal networks from different regions of the country, which also allowed new alliances and ruptures. When would the leadership of a criminal group in Maranhão or Acre have contact with the leadership of already large and established factions in São Paulo or Rio de Janeiro?

The transfer of the leaders of organized crime to federal prisons was fundamental to the nationalization project of the PCC and the CV, which required the regimentation of new members. Specifically, with respect to the PCC, Manso and Dias state that, until 2012, the PCC had around 2,400 members spread across 24 Federation Units. By the beginning of 2018, the PCC had gained 18,000 members, of which 3,000 were in São Paulo and 15,000 in other states, increasing to more than 29,000 members across the country.

It was due to the expansion of both across Brazil that a tacit alliance between the two groups ended up turning into a cold war in 2014/2015, which heated up significantly from 2017, which was a year with a significant number of killings in several states.

The CV and the PCC have similar discourses, in which they criticize the “prison oppression,” but somewhat different practices. The PCC is more organized and dangerous in the long term. It is present in more than twenty states. In São Paulo, Paraná and Mato Grosso do Sul, it has hegemony in the prison system. In addition to being present in several other states, it also has a network of allies. Most of its income comes from drug trafficking and its members control the entry and distribution of the drugs in the prisons, where they are in the majority, as well as a good part of the drug sales points on the streets.

The strength of this organization can be assessed by the number of members, called "brothers," who are baptized in a specific ritual when they join. Other allied but unbaptized criminals are known as "cousins." To be baptized, a candidate must be sponsored by at least one member. There are prisoners in Mato Grosso do Sul who have admitted that they have baptized more than 100 "brothers" in the northeast over the phone. Despite functioning more or less as a collegiate body, its structure is rigid. The orders, in many cases, come from São Paulo or Paraná. Telephone calls from Mato Grosso do Sul were also intercepted in some states in the northeast, appointing "brothers" to leadership positions.

This centralization has caused problems with traditional criminal leaders in some states. Many did not submit and created local groups to oppose the PCC. This reaction often implied an alliance with the Comando Vermelho, which is a much less centralized organization. With the alliances, the CV gained encouragement and started to occupy an important space in the prison system and in the national drug trafficking. In addition to Rio de Janeiro, where they dominate close to 50% of the prison system, they have a strong presence in more than a dozen states. Its performance, however, is decentralized. Two examples are Amazonas, where it was allied with the Família do Norte, and Mato Grosso, where it is headed by a local criminal and maintains a very tenuous link with the Rio de Janeiro CV.

In some states, the two groups alternate between an armed truce and war. The clearest example is Ceará. In early 2016, the PCC and CV discussed the terms of an agreement within the prisons but, due to the national rivalry, the agreement apparently did not materialize. The following year, the two large organizations began to confront each other, each one allied with a different group. The CV with a few members of the Família do Norte, and the PCC with the GDE (Guardiões do Estado) possibly the largest group in the state. Ceará is one of the cases in which an important local organization allied itself with the PCC. Many prefer the CV because it is more flexible and keeps the old leaders in power. The Primeiro Comando, in turn, when it assumes power, tinkers with the entire hierarchy and the appointment of leaders comes from the distant leadership.

Even in locations where the two groups are not in open conflict, the alliances are unstable, and are at the mercy of both local interests and national disagreements. A war can start at any moment because of the dispute over points of sale or because one of the sides is seen to be growing too much.

37 The information about the situation in Ceará is from work carried out by the Brazilian Forum of Security for the Secretary of Public Security and Social Defense of that state for more than three years.

38 Information regarding the structure in each state comes from interviews carried out over the years, mainly with state police and prison officers.
In addition to these two organizations, the most well-known in the country are: the Família do Norte, which operates in the Amazon region and in part of the northeast; the PGC (Primeiro Group Catarinense), which dominates most of the prisons in Santa Catarina; the Bonde dos 40, mainly in Maranhão; the GDE in Ceará; the Bonde dos 12 in Tocantins; and the Bonde dos 13 in Acre. There are several others, but most have an uncertain longevity.

The only group that maintains a permanent monthly fee is PCC. Its members, when out of jail, have to pay a monthly fee of about a minimum wage. All the other groups rely almost exclusively on drug trafficking and/or the participation in other crimes; therefore, they are more willing to go to war for points of sale or access to drugs. In 2016, what was an armed peace turned into a war declared between the CV and the PCC. The event that triggered the conflict was the death of the drug trafficker Jorge Rafaat, a Paraguayan who intermediated the trafficking in the region of Ponta Porã. The homicide, organized by the Primeiro Comando, increased the power of the group and almost gave it the control of the most direct and secure cocaine trafficking route in existence, that of the dry border between Paraguay and Mato Grosso do Sul. The loss of this shortest route to supply its market in the southeast and northeast was an important reason for CV to concentrate its efforts in the Amazon, first through the Solimões River, and then opening up other river, air and land routes. Henceforth, the importance of the states of Pará and Amazonas, which goes beyond the control of the distribution in the local retail market.

The major ally of the Comando Vermelho in the region was the Familia do Norte, which controlled most of the points of sale of drugs in the Amazon. A rift between the two groups, in 2019, sparked one of the biggest massacres that ever took place in Brazilian prisons. A dispute between sectors of the Familia do Norte who wanted to remain allied with the CV and others who wanted to leave the coalition was the trigger for the massacre that took place at the Anísio Jobim Penitentiary Complex (Compaj), in Manaus (AM). Between the May 26 and 28, 58 prisoners were murdered by hanging or using cold weapons, during the visiting hours. Currently, according to information from the Department of Prison Administration of the state, the CV gives the orders in the Amazon system.39

These prison killings have been a constant factor in the disputes for space between the traditional criminal organizations in the Amazon. One of the first cases occurred at the start of 2017, also in Amazonas. At this event, there were prisoners also linked to the Familia do Norte faction, at the time allied with the CV, who massacred members of the PCC.

The reprisal came in the dawn of January 6, 2017, when 33 prisoners linked to the Comando Vermelho were murdered by members of the PCC in Monte Cristo, the largest prison unit in the state of Roraima. In a more recent case, prisoners linked to the Comando Classe A, in Altamira, killed 62 rivals from the Comando Vermelho in July 2021. The analysis of the cases reveals that this dispute over the control of prisons in the region shows no signs of stopping. The reason is that the moments of calm are only specious, signifying that the faction are taking a break, because it is an intermittent conflict. It has “peaks of extreme violence that quickly dissipate to the ‘normal’ level”.40


CHAPTER 3: VIOLENCE AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE LEGAL AMAZON

From the 1980s onwards, it is recognized that Brazil experienced a significant growth in homicide rates, which were concentrated mainly in the large urban centers, with the violence somewhat concentrated in the capitals and metropolitan regions throughout the 1990s, as demonstrated in a series of publications by Waiselfisz in the Map of Violence between 1998 and 2016 (WAILSELFISZ, 1998, 2002, 2010).

The participation of the capitals in the homicidal violence has fallen progressively since the end of the 1990s: if, in 1997, around 43% of the homicides occurred in the capitals, in 2007, this share dropped to 34.6%, and to 22.3%, in 2019. This process did not, however, mean a reduction in the violent mortality rates in the country. On the contrary, they continued to grow until reaching a peak in 2017, when more than 65,000 people were murdered in Brazil (IPEA, FBSP, 2019).


The analysis of the variation between 1980 and 2019 indicates that the homicide mortality rate grew by 85% in Brazil in the period, but with very different behaviors over the years. While in the southeast region, the growth occurred in the 1990s, from the beginning of the 2000s, the north and northeast regions have had the greatest growth. Therefore, while in the southeast the homicide mortality rate dropped by 19.2% between 1980 and 2019, in the north there was a growth of 260.3% and in the northeast an increase of 296.8%. While the homicidal violence has fallen in the large urban centers of the southeast, especially in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, there is a significant growth in other regions, which is a reflection of the structural inequalities of the Brazilian society, the availability of access to firearms and the expansion of drug trafficking (FILHO, MERCHAN-HAMANN, VASCONCELOS, 2020).

In other words, the numbers reveal that, at least since the 2000s, the spread of homicidal violence in Brazil has changed. Whereas previously it was concentrated in large urban centers, it has started to spread to smaller towns, in the interior, described by several authors as a phenomenon of the internalization of violence (WAISELFISZ, 2010; CERQUEIRA, et al, 2016).

These numbers also reflect the expansion and nationalization movement of the two abovementioned criminal groups from the southeast, the PCC and the CV. As can be observed, the operation of the organized crime in the drug trafficking in the Legal Amazon is a central factor in the analysis of the dynamics of the violence in the region, especially in the last decade, when there has been an unprecedented expansion. In the following topic, the subject will be discussed in detail.

Source: SIM/Datasus; Brazilian Forum of Public Security.


As discussed above, the Amazon region is an overlapping space for various forms of illegal activity. With the difficulties of governance of the public security in the region, there are high rates of Intentional Violent Deaths (IVD), above the national average, as well as significant evidence of their association with environmental crimes. To a large extent, it is possible to recognize that the actual geography of the region contributes to this overlap, because the routes, whether by river, highway or air, are often the only ones existing in certain territorialities, contributing to their use for different purposes.

However, it is important to recognize here the importance to the criminal dynamics of the region of the establishment of criminal organizations, mainly those based in prisons. The relative weight of these groups in the criminal configuration, in Brazil as a whole, and in the Amazon region in particular, is significant. It makes their analysis important in order to understand the recent scenario of the indicators of violence and the interconnections between different criminal modalities, including those involving the environment. This section of the publication will be dedicated to this task.

The Amazon is a central location for the multiple relationships that are established from the regional/global market of the trafficking of drugs and arms. Due to this position, it needs to be seen from a broader context regarding the forms of occupation and the use of its territory by the organized networks of criminality and unlawful acts that operate in it. Accordingly, briefly, it is worth highlighting that, for example, the Amazon River is a significant corridor for the transport of drugs (especially cocaine and skank) between producing and consuming hubs, whether national or transnational. It connects to other rivers providing a wide fluvial integration, such as the one that connects to the Solimões River and serves to transport drugs along routes that come from Peru, more specifically using the Javari River and the Ícã River. It also integrates Colombia through the twin cities of Leticia (Colombia) and Tabatinga (Amazonas). This route goes up river, passing through the cities of Tefé and Fonte Boa and heading towards Manaus, joining the Amazon River. There is also the interaction that takes place along the Purus River, crossing the state of Acre, connecting to Peru and Bolivia through the city of Assis Brasil and heading towards Manaus. The Madeira River, on the other hand, crosses Rondônia, connecting to Bolivia through the city of Guajará Mirim, and it reaches the city of La Paz using the Abunã River.
The Juruá River is also important for the route that goes from Peru through the city of Porto Valter heading towards the Amazon River. However, the Japurá River is a route that receives cocaine, skank and marijuana in Brazilian territory, because this route goes towards the Solimões River with Manaus as its destination, which is a major distributor. Still in Amazonas, there is the connection between the Uaupés River in Colombia and the Rio Negro in Brazil and the Rio Branco in Acre through the city of Pacaraima to the city of Manaus. In other words, Amazonas is the major port of entry for drugs and the capital Manaus is the main distribution center.

In the region of the upper and middle Rio Negro, data produced by the Public Security Work Group realized by state and federal prosecutors in Amazonas indicate that the invasion of lands to be used as a route for drug trafficking is one of the main crimes/threats to territorial rights and to the lives of people practiced by third parties. Furthermore, in the same region, illegal artisanal mining and mineral exploitation also stand out. In relation to the crimes that occur within the indigenous lands, they were identified by the interlocutors of the Work Group in order of importance: bodily harm, violence against women, femicide, homicide, rape and abuse of power.

In Pará, the routes constitute a transit area for the drug towards the national and international markets, because via the Amazon River the networks integrate the city of Santarém, although the destination of the drug is the capital Belém. Through the Amazon River, there is also an integration by the Xingu River, via Altamira, which has become a major drug trading post with the presence of the criminal factions. Finally, the network is completed through the connection between the Amazon River and the Tocantins River via the cities of Cametá, Abaetetuba, Barcarena, Moju and Igarapé Miri. Belém and Barcarena stand out as important distribution points of the drug to Europe.

While the Amazon is extremely important for the routes of the drug trafficking that use the rivers, in Amapá, Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia and Tocantins the highways fulfill this role. The Cuiabá-Porto Velho highway connects the networks that go from Bolivia in the border region with Rondônia and the interaction of Mato Grosso with the west of Pará through the BR-163 (Cuiabá-Santarém), which integrates with the Trans-Amazonian Highway, the Xingu River and the Amazon River, connecting the Altamira region. In Pará, there are interactions that take place from the Trans-Amazonian Highway, from Santarém towards Belém and the northeast region of the state. There is also integration through the
Belém-Brasília, Pará-Maranhão and Transcametá highways towards the south, southeast and center-west regions of Brazil, in addition to expanding the routes to the northeast from Maranhão.

What can be observed is that the east Amazon is much more integrated in relation to the highway routes, while the water routes prevail in the west Amazon. However, there are areas of connectivity between the means of transport, transforming them into multimodal transports used by the drug trafficking networks.

There are also air routes, where the drug traffickers pay pilots of light aircraft that transport the cocaine, either crossing borders on low flights, or refueling the aircraft already in Brazilian territory to continue the transport towards other regions. Therefore, it is common in the Amazon to have clandestine airstrips that are built to receive drugs. These airstrips have been found both in the middle of forests and on farms.47

The air networks are not restricted only to clandestine spaces camouflaged in the middle of the forest, because there are, in the Amazon, private airstrips with authorization to operate, and also the landing strips of airports in the capital cities, such as the airports of Manaus and Belém. The connectivity relationships that involve this air traffic highlight the Amazon, which concentrates more intensely these flights that cross Mato Grosso towards the southeast region. In the case of Pará, there is a connection with the international markets, therefore completing the drug transport networks in the Legal Amazon.

47 In one of the field interviews carried out in Manaus, the importance of controlling the logistics of transport and distribution of aviation fuel as a strategy to combat crime was highlighted. The Federal Police had achieved, together with the ANP (National Petroleum Agency), an ordinance (not located) involved in this process.
The above map combines all these methods of transporting the drug in the Amazon. The rivers and airways are integrated with the ports, warehouses, terminals and airports involving several cities from the region. In fact, cities and transport routes form a cross-border, socio-spatial interaction, consequently highlighting the role of the Amazon in the geography of the drug trafficking networks. This largely explains the arrival of the organized crime factions in the region, as well as the emergence and growth of the regional factions, especially the Família Do Norte (FDN), from Amazonas, and the Comando Classe.
A (CCA), from Pará, in addition to the national groups such as the Comando Vermelho (CV), from Rio de Janeiro, and the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), from São Paulo.

Although the map combines all the information about the routes used by the drug trafficking in the construction of networks of interactions, it is not a question of highlighting these routes as a finding in itself, but rather drawing attention to the reports of unlawful activities that demonstrate the fragility of the policies of public security in the monitoring and the interception of the volume of drugs that enter Brazilian territory through the borders of the Amazon.

Another observation concerns the fact that in some states connected to the illegal networks, the road or the river appears as the only viable alternative for the transport of drugs, added to the volatility of the movements that occur on days and times involving any type of police operation or inspection by the law enforcement agencies.

In the current context of the expansion of the global markets, the drug trafficking has imposed a perverse logic of integration on the territorial borders of the national states, in which the economy of crime presents itself as a restructuring and organizing element of the global movements of capital, people, information and merchandise. In this way, the global crime of drug trafficking is strengthened by integrating itself into the market, becoming a highly profitable and problematic activity in relation to the mechanisms of protection and public security (COUTO, 2019).

The cities of Belém and Manaus are two important regional metropolises that historically suffer from the problems of urban violence related to the presence of gangs, death squads and drug trafficking, and which have been aggravated by the arrival of the criminal factions from the southeast, especially the PCC and the CV. With the growth of cocaine trafficking in the Amazon, these two metropolises have been highlighted in disputes for the control of the drug market, because they constitute important hubs of spatial interaction for the networks in the region for the transport of the drug to the national and global markets. It is not by accident that the regional drug trafficking groups began to organize themselves in order to control the main distribution and consumption routes in the region.

In 2007, the Família Do Norte emerged in Amazonas, which is a regional faction created within the penitentiary system and which started to exert influence in the north region of the country. Subsequently, the FDN took control of the main route for the cocaine entry into the Amazon, the Solimões River, which has always been of geostrategic interest to the PCC, because it connects the triple border between Brazil, Colombia and Peru. The FDN also sought to develop other activities typical of the criminal economy, such as arms trafficking.

Until 2017, the FDN and the CV were allies. Currently, the groups are rivals, in that the CV managed to control Manaus after a long war with the FDN. The conflicts between the two began when, in 2017, a group of FDN members tried to divide the areas of influence of the drug market in Manaus, a fact that gave rise to a third group, the “pure FDN.” This dissent from the FDN, according to reports from the police heard by the project, was allied with the CV, which in turn already controlled the drug trafficking routes in Colombia. This ended up expanding the CV’s influence in the region, but also made the FDN and CV start to dispute the control of the market and the drug routes in Manaus and in Amazonas.
In Pará, also in 2017, there was the creation of the Primeiro Comando do Norte (PCN), a faction allied to the São Paulo PCC, which emerged as a strategy of the latter to expand its influence within the prison system of the north region and, at the same time, to control the market and the drug trafficking routes in Altamira and Marabá. Due to the arrest of several members of the PCN, the faction had a short life and was soon dissolved. The Comando Classe A (CCA) also emerged in pavilion A of the Altamira penitentiary system, which would become a kind of arm of the PCC in the region and ally itself with other factions operating there, namely the Bonde dos 13 (B13), the IFARA (Irmandade, Força Ativa e Responsabilidade Acreana), the Família Terror do Amapá and the Primeiro Comando da Capital. This shows the connection between the factions from the states of Acre, Amapá, Pará and São Paulo. Field work with interviews by the team from UEPA and research reports founded this analysis and information and constituted primary data.

According to the collected reports, two other groups operate in Pará: the Primeira Guerrilha do Norte (PGN), a small faction allied to the PCC that emerged in the interior of the state, in the region of Colônia do Prata, in the municipality of Igarapé Mirim, in northeast Pará; and the Equipe Rex, which is present in the Terra Firme neighborhood, on the outskirts of Belém. In the case of the Equipe Rex, as well as other small groups of local expression, there was integration with the Comando Vermelho, which today has great influence in the metropolitan region of Belém. The following map shows the spatial representation of the criminal factions in the Amazon states and in the neighboring countries that make up the Pan-Amazon region, made from reports collected during the field work.

**MAP 10**

**Criminal Organizations in the border countries of the Amazon (2021)**

**Key**

- Presence of more than one faction
- Caquetéños
- Cartel de Los Sales
- Clã Los Bolongos
- Clã Los Quipe Palomino
- ELN
- Ex-membros das FARC
- Trem de Araguá
- Urabeños
- Los Puntilleros
- Clã Dourado
- PCC

- Other Bolivian factions
- Countries with a faction in the Pan-Amazon region
- States of the Legal Amazon
- Territorial limits

**Regional departments with the presence of more than one faction**

1. North of Santander (Colombia) – Los Pelusos and ELN
2. Antioquia (Colombia) – Oficina de Envigado and Urabeños
3. Guainía (Colombia) – Cartel de Los Sales and Trem de Araguá
4. Chocó (Colombia) – Urabeños and ELN
5. Putumayo (Colombia) – Caquetéños and Ex-members of the FARC
6. Guárico (Venezuela) – Cartel de Los Sales and Trem de Araguá

**Map references**

- System of geographic coordinates: Lat/Long Datum: GRS 1980
- Source: PF, 2021; ORSO-PA, 2020; Journalistic survey
- Map preparation
- Map organization
- Date: April 3, 2021

**Source:** Group TERRA/UEPA/FBSP (2021).
The criminal factions from Brazil also coordinate with criminal groups from the countries of South America, as described in the previous map. The Amazon is surrounded by these factions and, as a transit area for drugs, it is the stage for strategies in conjunction with the Brazilian factions so that the illegal merchandise can enter by the borders of the country and reach the main markets. Accordingly, the Brazilian factions depend on these relationships to receive the drugs and to sell the cocaine, ecstasy and skank in the domestic market and in the transactions that involve the global market.

**MAP 11**
Drug trafficking factions and megabands in the Pan-Amazon region (2021)

It can be seen that, in the case of the Amazon region, there are several groups that operate in its states, where there is the presence of local, regional and national factions that dispute their respective areas of influence. This information was collected from the analysis of newspaper reports that had produced stories based on disclosed police reports.

The analysis of each state allows us to make the following considerations:

a) In Acre, at least four groups operate to control the entry of drugs through the borders with Peru, namely: the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), the IFARA (Irmandade, Força Ativa e Responsabilidade Acreana)), the Bonde dos 13 (B13) and the Comando Vermelho (CV);

b) In Amazonas, which is the state where the Família do Norte (FDN) emerged, there is now the FDN, the CV and the PCC, which operate in the Solimões River region. Furthermore, there are groups of
pirates who intercept the drugs being transported along the rivers in the Coari region, known as the Família do Coari, making the conflicts between the factions even more complex in this state, which is the major port of entry for cocaine into Brazil;

c) In Amapá, two local factions are highlighted, the União Criminosa do Amapá (UCA) and the Família Terror do Amapá (FTA), with the latter being allied with the PCC. This region is strategic for the drug trafficking that passes through Amapá towards the Guyanas and Suriname, as well as being notorious for smuggling and human trafficking;

d) In Mato Grosso, there is the CV, the PCC and the B13. In this state, the dispute is over the supply of cocaine from Bolivia and marijuana from Paraguay;

e) In Maranhão, there are at least four main criminal factions in operation: the Bonde dos 40 (B40), the Primeiro Comando do Maranhão (PCM), the PCC and the CV. There is a dispute that takes place, above all, inside the prison system in the state and that mainly involves the PCC and its allies versus the CV and its allies;

f) In Pará, there is evidence of the presence of the CV, which is predominant in the metropolitan region of Belém, and of the PCC, which operates more in the interior, in the regions of Altamira and the surrounding areas. However, there are also state factions such as the CCA, the FDN and small local factions, but with a significant influence in the prison units, such as the Equipe Rex. Finally, there is also the B40 group that emerged in the northeast region, but which operates in the Amazon from Pará;

g) In Roraima, there are factions such as the CV, the FDN, the PCC and the Primeiro Comando Panda (PCP), and also the presence of criminal groups from Venezuela, such as the Pranato, which is a faction operating in the southeast region of this country, on the borders with the Guyanas and Roraima. The connection that part of this region has with the Pacific is perceptible, cutting through the Guyanas, Suriname and Amapá in Brazil in order to supply the illegal merchandise to Europe and the Brazilian market;

h) In Rondônia, there are criminal factions that dispute the drug trade on the border with Bolivia, with evidence of the presence of the PCP, CV, FDN and B13. This region is extremely strategic for the entry of cocaine from Bolivia and Peru that crosses the state of Mato Grosso and heads towards the south and southeast regions;

i) Finally, Tocantins has the presence of the PCC, CCA and B13 and some small local factions. In this state, there is a strong influence by the PCC inside the prisons, which makes it easier for the local groups to establish a relationship that provides the conditions for the São Paulo group to operate in the region.

In these terms, the Colombian cartels, the factions from the Andean countries and the organized crime groups from Brazil constitute a network of relationships that result from the financial resources generated by the international trafficking of drugs. With the exception of Amapá, all the other Amazon states have the presence of the CV and the PCC.
In the following map, the areas in red represent the municipalities with the presence of the CV, the areas in yellow represent the presence of the PCC, although the areas shaded with the two colors are the municipalities in which these two groups are in dispute. It can be observed that Mato Grosso and Pará are the two states that most exhibit these conflicts.

MAP 12
Expansion of the PCC and CV factions in the Legal Amazon

Map references
System of geographic coordinates Lat/Long
Datum: SIRGAS, 2000
Source: INE, 2015; DNF, 2019; BRASIL, 2019; IBAMA, 2020; SEMA/PA, 2020
Journalistic sources
Map preparation: SABINO, T. A. G; FERREIRA, W. M.
Map organization: COUTO, A. O. C
Date: September 2021

The following chart summarizes the information with respect to the presence of the factions in each state of the Legal Amazon region. It is important to mention that the dynamics of the disputes between the criminal organizations are extremely volatile, so that the domain of one region or another is subject to transformations that can be beyond the scope of the researchers.

**CHART 1**
Factions operating in the states of the Legal Amazon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Factions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>CV, PCC, Bonde dos 13 and IFARA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>FDN, PCC and CV and Família do Coari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amapá</td>
<td>Família Terror do Amapá and União Criminosa do Amapá</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mato Grosso</td>
<td>CV, PCC and Comando Terrorista do MT (local faction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pará</td>
<td>CV, CCA, PCC, FDN, Primeira Guerrilha do Norte (PGN), Bonde dos 40, Equipe Rex and Galera do Aurá (GDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maranhão</td>
<td>CV, PCC, Bonde dos 40, Primeiro Comando do Maranhão (PCM) and Comando Organizado do Maranhão (COM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roraima</td>
<td>CV, PCC, FDN, Primeiro Comando Panda (PCP), Trem do Araguá and Pranato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rondônia</td>
<td>Bonde dos 13, CV, CCA, PCC and PCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tocantins</td>
<td>CV, PCC and Máfia Tocantinense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Environmental and land conflicts and rural violence in the Legal Amazon

The phenomenon of the expansion of the criminal organizations is combined with another, also documented in the literature, which demonstrates the association between deforestation and the intensification of the land conflicts, also resulting in the growth of lethal violence. In general, the available studies demonstrate that the violence in the rural areas is associated with a series of factors that involve the illegal exploitation of natural resources, land conflicts involving the possession and ownership of lands, the construction of large projects – such as the building of the Belo Monte power plant, in Pará, as well as the development of other illegal activities such as the smuggling of wild animals and the trafficking of narcotics (IPEA, 2020).

The 2020 report by MapBiomas\(^49\) points to the growth in deforestation in the six Brazilian biomes resulting in the loss of 24 trees per second in 2020. Specifically, in the Amazon, the increase is 9%, and MapBiomas calculates that 99.4% of the deforested areas have signs of irregularity, i.e., they are the result of illegal actions.

The Deforestation Warning System (SAD)\(^50\) of Imazon shows that, in September 2021, the forest lost the equivalent of 4,000 football pitches daily. This means that the area devastated in the last month was equivalent to the territory of the city of Rio de Janeiro, and the accumulated first nine months of the year indicates a growth of 39% in relation to 2020, which was a year that also had significant growth.

According to the Institute for Space Research (INPE), mining deforested 102.42 km\(^2\) between January and August 2021, which is a volume greater than all the devastation caused by mining in the previous year. Although the INPE monitoring does not distinguish between mining activity and illegal artisanal mining, data from the Socioenvironmental Institute (ISA) indicates a 16% growth in the deforestation was caused by artisanal mining in protected areas of the Amazon between August 2020 and August 2021.

The advance of the deforestation is marked by conflicts and invasions that result in violence. The reduction in the forest cover of the Mosaico Gurupi, for example, has led to pressure on legally protected areas, such as indigenous lands and conservation units, increasing the invasions for the illegal extraction of timber as well as the growth of violence against indigenous people (CELENTANO \textit{et al.}, 2018).

The most recent report by the Indigenous Missionary Council (CIMI), referring to the 2019 data, highlights the growth of 16 of the 19 categories of violence systematized by the entity and the registration of 256

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50 Available at: https://imazon.org.br/imprensa/amazonia-perdeu-area-de-floresta-maior-do-que-4-mil-campos-de-futebol-por-dia-em-setembro/

cases of “possessory invasions, illegal exploitation of resources and damage to property” in at least 151 indigenous lands, of 143 peoples, in 23 states, where an increase of 134.9% of the cases registered in 2018 is recorded. In the same period, 113 assassinations and 20 negligent homicides were registered, which, when added to the other cases of violence against indigenous people totaled 277 cases in 2019 – double the number registered in 2018 (CIMI, 2020). According to the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT), in 2020, of the 81,225 families that suffered from invasions, 58,327 were indigenous, which means 71.8% of the total. In 2019, this percentage was 66.5% (26,621) and, in 2018, it was 50.1% (14,757). If only the increment in impacted indigenous families is considered, between 2018 and 2020, there was a 295% increase in the registrations of invasions of indigenous lands (CPT, 2021).

The absence of the state, whether in the form of punishment of those who commit environmental crimes, or the lack of protection for the traditional people, ends up encouraging illegal actions. The 2021 Atlas of Violence showed a 21.6% growth of homicides of indigenous people in Brazil. Between 2009 and 2019, 2,074 homicides of indigenous people were registered in all the country, according to data from the Mortality Information System (SIM), produced by the Ministry of Health. The data indicates that the homicide rates of this population have increased in the last decade, in contrast to the general Brazilian rate. The deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in the case of the indigenous population went from 15 per 100,000 in 2009 to 24.9 in 2017, falling in 2019, when the figure was 18.3 per 100,000 indigenous people. The general homicide rate in Brazil was 27.2 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2009, reaching the peak also in 2017, with 31.6 per 100,000, and falling to 21.7 in 2019 (IPEA; FBSP, 2021). The national rate, therefore, had a drop of 20.2% between 2009 and 2019, which is a pattern different from that observed among the indigenous population.

TABLE 1

Homicide Rate: Brazil and number and rate of homicides: indigenous people (2009 to 2019)

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil (Rate)</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous People (Rate)</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous People (Number)</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2010 Census, PNADIC, National Indian Foundation (Funai), MS/SVS/CGIAE – Mortality Information System – SIM. The number of homicides of indigenous people in the UF of residence was obtained by adding the following 10 CIDs: X85-Y09 and Y35, i.e.: deaths caused by aggression plus legal intervention. The indigenous population used to calculate the rate of indigenous homicides is an estimate that followed the following stages: 1) The proportion of indigenous people in each municipality was calculated using the number of indigenous people and the total number of people living in municipalities from the 2010 Census; 2) This proportion was applied to the population of each municipality (and in each year) found in the Resident Population Estimates for the TCU (Available at: http://tabnet.datasus.gov.br/cgi/tabcgi.exe?ibge/cnv/poptbr.def); 3) Added to the indigenous population of all the municipalities in each year.

Preparation: Diest/Ipea, FBSP and UIN.


According to the latest report from the CPT, 2020 was the year with the highest number of conflicts in the countryside since 1985 (CPT, 2021). According to the report, there was an 8% increase in the number of conflicts in the countryside across Brazil in 2020, when compared to 2019. The report also shows that the Legal Amazon region concentrated 62.4% of the land conflicts in Brazil in that year.


The multiple uses of the land in the region, some of which are the result of illegal acts, as evidenced in Chapter 1, necessarily bring into contact a set of actors with completely contradictory interests and practices, such as the indigenous population, quilombolas, riverside dwellers, chestnut farmers, landholders, farmers of large estates, artisanal miners, loggers, the police and state agents. These tensions are constitutive of the social structure of the Legal Amazon region, but they have been extremely exacerbated in the last 2 years, with the beginning of the administration of President Bolsonaro and the change in the politics of the region.

In 2019, in the first year of the mandate of the current government, the highest number of reports of land conflicts in Brazil since 2003 was registered, growing even more in the following year. As a result of these conflicts, deaths are registered every year, which is perhaps one of the consequences that needs to be paid more attention. The subject of violence against people in conflicts in the countryside will be returned to later.

One of the main sources of data regarding the conflicts in the countryside and the violence against land workers (traditional communities, rural workers, indigenous people and artisanal fishermen) are the reports by the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT), which have been produced systematically since the 1980s. The reports – which now total 35 annual editions – are the result of an operation that combines research work, verification, cataloging and the interpretation of information carried out by the Dom Tomás Balduino Documentation Center (Cedoc). The conflicts registered by the CPT are those resulting from actions of resistance and confrontation that took place in the rural areas and that may involve the struggle for land, water, rights or the means to work.

Due to the nature of this report, the land conflicts are the ones that will gain greater evidence, understood as actions of resistance and confrontation that result from access to natural resources. The most extreme consequence of these conflicts is the lethal violence that can assail those who struggle to have access to or resist the land that was legally destined to them. Their intentional death, therefore, means more than the loss of human life, because it heeds the very struggle to defend the environment and the rights of the indigenous people. Sobreiro Filho (2019) sums up this idea by stating that the murder of people also signifies the murder of territories.

The presented data indicates an important increase in the total number of land conflicts registered between 2011, when 818 events were counted, and 2020, when this number reached 1,576 (CPT, 2021, page 22). Consequently, 2020 was the year in which there were the highest number of conflicts in the countryside since 1985.

The context behind these episodes, however, has been changing over the last 4 decades. According to the assessment of the researchers from the CPT, the conflicts in the countryside in the Brazil of the “New Republic” are distributed as follows: a) in the 1980s, the background of the violence is the authoritarian legacy left by the period of the military dictatorship; b) in the 1990s, the neoliberal shock and the “agricultural modernization” that drove land concentration and the aggravation of land conflicts gained importance; c) in the 2000s, there were the actions of neo-developmentalist governments and

social policies for the countryside that aimed, at the same time, to encourage small and medium rural producers and to strengthen agribusiness from the development of production chains; d) finally, from 2015, a new cohesion can be observed between the political forces of financial capital, of the large estates and the transactional companies, while the social policies for the countryside are weakened (CPT, 2021, page 203).

This conjunctural history of the recent decades sets the tone for the scenario of the conflict in the countryside in 2020. Therefore, if the average between 1990-1995 was 550 conflicts per year, even if the following period is marked by advances in the policy of agrarian reform, in the titling of quilombola territories, the demarcation of indigenous lands and in the introduction of various social policies aimed at the rural population, there was no drop in the number of conflicts. Between 2008 and 2015, the annual average was 1,254 events, according to the registrations of the reports by the CPT (CPT, 2021, page 205). From 2016, there has been an increase in the conflicts that intensify even more in 2019 and 2020.

What is behind these numbers, therefore, are the attacks carried out by those who represent the large estates, land grabbing, agribusiness and the state against social movements of the countryside and populations historically involved in the defense of environmental resources. These conflicts are located territorially. According to a study carried out by the team from LEMTO–UFF, based on the CPT report of 2015, between 2000 and 2015, the localized conflicts in the Amazon (region) accounted for 44% of all the registrations (CPT, 2021, page 205). Therefore, the researchers in the area concluded that there is an advance on the “agricultural frontier” towards the Amazon, after the agribusiness had already been consolidated in the other regions of the country, such as the south, southeast and center-west up to the 1980s.

**CHART 2**

Land conflicts in the states of the Legal Amazon, by quantity of families and involved categories (2020)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Land Conflicts</th>
<th>Families</th>
<th>Involved Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4,469</td>
<td>Landholder, rubber tapper, indigenous, extractivist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amapá</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2,998</td>
<td>Landholder, settler, riverside dweller, quilombola, extractivist, indigenous, landless, pastoral agent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>12,252</td>
<td>Indigenous, settler, landholder, extractivist, riverside dweller, rubber tapper.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maranhão</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>20,864</td>
<td>Settled, landless, small landowner, quilombola, landholder, indigenous, fisherman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mato Grosso</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>13,029</td>
<td>Indigenous, riverside dweller, quilombola, settler, landless, landholder, extractivist, fisherman, small landowner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pará</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>28,608</td>
<td>Quilombola, settler, indigenous, extractivist, riverside dweller, landless, small landowner, pastoral agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rondônia</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>6,846</td>
<td>Indigenous, quilombola, landless, landholder, extractivist, settler, affected by dam, small landowner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roraima</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16,806</td>
<td>Indigenous, landless.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tocantins</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4,202</td>
<td>Landless, quilombola, affected by dam, landholder, indigenous.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,002</strong></td>
<td><strong>110,074</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Pastoral Land Commission (CPT); Brazilian Forum of Public Security (FBSP).*
The 2020 data of the CPT also indicates that 46.8% of the total of the families impacted by the conflicts involving the illegal deforestation in the country live in Pará. The north region, in turn, concentrated 17,561 victimized families, or 68.7% of the total. Maranhão, the transition zone between the Amazon and the Cerrado, was the second state with the highest number of reports involving the illegal deforestation, with 17.7% of the total. The state of Rondônia was the third state, with 13.1% of the victimized families and Mato Grosso was the fourth, with 6.8% , (CPT, 2021, page. 140).

The publication *The violence in the countryside of the Amazon: an analysis of the data regarding the murders, threats and profiles of those murdered* provides specific data with respect to the lethal violence arising from the conflicts in the countryside occurring across the broader territory of the Amazon. In the analyzed period (1985-2019), it was found that the phenomenon occurred with greater intensity in Pará (31% of total murders) and in Maranhão (9.3%).

Approximately 13% of these deaths resulted from massacres, i.e., when three or more people were murdered in the same context. The data indicates a correlation between the increase/reduction of massacres and the increase/reduction of the murders in general in the countryside, which indicates the importance of this type of event as well as the symbolic violence that somehow indicates the level of lethal violence in the region.

Among the total set of victims, there are lawyers, environmentalists, the landless, landholders, religious people, indigenous people, riverside dwellers and quilombolas, among others. According to the abovementioned report, which analyzed the data from the entire period (1985-2019), 373 (20.55%)
landholders were fatally victimized in all the country, 281 (15.48%) landless, 187 (10, 30%) leaders, 160 (8.81%) rural workers, 159 (8.76%) indigenous people, 105 (5.78%) settlers and 99 (5.45%) farmers, among other categories.

This proportion does not change when only the states belonging to the Amazon region are observed. In this territory, the murders are also more concentrated among landholders, landless, leaders, indigenous people, rural workers and settlers, in this order. When calculating the total number of deaths by category, the registrations indicate, for example, that of all the landless people killed in this period, 68% were killed in some state with an Amazon biome. Among the landholders, this figure is 79.9% and among indigenous people it is 57%.

In relation to the last year, with registrations released by the CPT (2021), there were 18 murders in conflict in the countryside. Of these, 7 were indigenous, 3 were riverside dwellers, 3 were quilombolas, 2 were landless, 1 was a settler, 1 was a lawyer and 1 was a landholder. The following table presents the general picture with all the types of violence against the person registered only in the states of the Legal Amazon in 2020.

### CHART 3
Violence against the person in the states of the Legal Amazon, by type of violence (2020)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federative Unit (UF)</th>
<th>Conflicts</th>
<th>Murders</th>
<th>Murder attempts</th>
<th>Death threats</th>
<th>Prisoners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amapá</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maranhão</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mato Grosso</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pará</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rondônia</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roraima</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tocantins</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,132</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>102</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pastoral Land Commission (CPT); Brazilian Forum of Public Security (FBSP).

It was not only among the fatal victims that the indigenous population was most affected. The registrations in the country point out that among the 35 people who suffered murder attempts, or attempted murder, 12 were indigenous. With respect to death threats in the country, among the 159 people threatened, 25 were indigenous.

What the data informs is that the violence that affects the populations that inhabit the territories of the Amazon has an important effect on the conflicts over land use. The registrations of the CPT, however, are restricted only to the families directly involved in the land conflicts, i.e., they are murders, attempts and threats that occur during the conflict itself.
The data presented in the following section was obtained by the Brazilian Forum of Public Security through the bases of microdata of Intentional Violent Deaths (IVD), produced by the State Departments of Public Security and/or Social Defense, referring to the cases that occurred in 2018 and 2020. This data concerns all the IVD registered in reports by the Civil Police, regardless of the reason of the fact. In the analyses that follow, we seek to correlate the lethal violence and deforestation by superimposing the information with respect to these two phenomena in the Amazon region.

Intentional violent deaths in the Amazon

In 2020, 8,729 intentional violent deaths were reported in the municipalities that compose the Legal Amazon. The profile of the victims does not differ from that seen in the rest of the country: 91% were men, 50% were between 15 and 29 years old and 84% were black. The map below depicts the location of the crimes by an absolute number in each municipality.

MAP 13
Intentional violent deaths in the Legal Amazon (2020)

Source: Own preparation from the data of the State Departments of Public Security and/or Social Defense and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. FBSP, 2021.

The concept of intentional violent deaths is used by the Brazilian Forum of Public Security to aggregate all the murders that occurred in the country into a single category. Intentional Violent Deaths include the reports of intentional homicide (including femicide), robbery, bodily harm followed by death and death by police intervention.
It can be ascertained that, in absolute terms, there is a concentration of violent deaths in the northeast area of the region and in the area more to the south of the Legal Amazon.

In regional terms, Graph 4 presents the numbers from the last decade of intentional violent deaths in the country with the average rates by region and for Brazil. It is possible to observe that the region with the highest growth in the rate of Intentional Violent Deaths in the period is the north region, which in 2011 had a rate of 20.5 IVD for each group of 100,000 inhabitants and, in 2020, this jumped to 30.2, an increase of 47.3%.

**GRAPH 4**

Evolution of the rate of intentional violent deaths, Brazil and regions, 2011-2020

![Graph showing the evolution of the rate of intentional violent deaths in Brazil and regions from 2011 to 2020.]

When providing details of the data by Federation Unit, the graph below shows the rates of violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants for each of the states that compose the region.
It is possible to note that, with the exception of Rondônia, all the states of the Legal Amazon have higher rates than the national rate. While Brazil has a rate of 23.6 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, in the Amazon region this rate is 29.6.

Between 2018 and 2020, a period in which the rate of intentional violent deaths fell by 14.7% in the country, the region composed by the municipalities of the Legal Amazon had a reduction of 16.4%. However, although the variation in the mortality rate in the region seems to follow the trend verified nationally, when the distribution is analyzed according to the municipal typology proposed by the IBGE, which differentiates the cities between urban and rural, a significant difference can be ascertained.
To distinguish the violence that occurs in urban and rural areas in the Legal Amazon, the municipal typology was used that is proposed by the IBGE in the study *Classification and characterization of rural and urban spaces in Brazil: a first approximation.* The classification takes into account three criteria: the absolute number of people living in densely occupied areas; the percentage of the population living in densely occupied areas; and the location of the municipality, which takes into consideration the relationship of the municipalities with larger urban centers, which have a greater complexity in the offer of goods and services. Based on the first two criteria, the municipalities can be classified as predominantly urban, intermediary and predominantly rural. Cross-referencing this classification with the third criterion, the proposed typology was obtained, which divides the Brazilian municipalities into five types: urban, adjacent intermediary, remote intermediary, adjacent rural and remote rural.

**FIGURE 1**
Classes and description of the urban and rural typology of the IBGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predominantly urban municipality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Municipalities in population units with more than 50,000 inhabitants in an area of dense occupation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Municipalities in population units that have between 25,000 and 50,000 inhabitants in an area of dense occupation with a degree of urbanization above 50%;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Municipalities in population units that have between 10,000 and 25,000 inhabitants in an area of dense occupation with a degree of urbanization above 75%.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intermediary municipality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Municipalities in population units that have between 25,000 and 50,000 inhabitants in an area of dense occupation with a degree of urbanization between 25 and 50%;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Municipalities in population units that have between 10,000 and 25,000 inhabitants in an area of dense occupation with a degree of urbanization between 50 and 75%;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Municipalities in population units that have between 3,000 and 10,000 inhabitants in an area of dense occupation with a degree of urbanization above 75%.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predominantly rural municipality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Municipalities in population units that have between 25,000 and 50,000 inhabitants in an area of dense occupation with a degree of urbanization below 25%;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Municipalities in population units that have between 10,000 and 25,000 inhabitants in an area of dense occupation with a degree of urbanization below 50%;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Municipalities in population units that have between 3,000 and 10,000 inhabitants in an area of dense occupation with a degree of urbanization below 75%.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The violent mortality rate in the urban municipalities of the Legal Amazon was 32.0 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2020, well above the national average (excluding the municipalities of the Legal Amazon), which was 22.0 per 100,000 in the same year. Despite being higher, it is necessary to highlight that the rate of intentional violent deaths in the urban municipalities of the Amazon region fell by 25.7%, from 43.1 per 100,000 in 2018 to 32.0 per 100,000 in 2020.

This reduction in murders verified regionally seems to be influenced, to some extent, by the apparent truce agreed between the Comando Vermelho and the PCC from 2019, after the 2017 split that caused...
an explosion of murders inside and outside of prisons throughout Brazil. The hegemony of armed groups in significant portions of some states cannot be ruled out either. In Acre, for example, the supremacy of the Comando Vermelho reduced the local disputes with other criminal groups, decreasing the conflicts. In Pará, in turn, the Comando Vermelho also dominates the region of Belém and the metropolitan region, reducing the level of the local conflict.

The Amazon region demonstrates itself to be an overlapping space of various forms of illegality. To a large extent, it is possible to recognize that the actual geography of the region contributes to this overlap, because the routes, whether via river, road or air, are often the only ones existing in certain territorialities, contributing to the use of the same modal but with different purposes. It is in this context that the region has become so strategic for drug trafficking, with the operation of criminal groups from Brazil and other countries.

The establishment of criminal organizations in the states of the region, as well as the expansion of the criminal groups in the southeast and their alliances with local groups, imposed new challenges on the territories. The proximity of the states of the region to the main cocaine producers in the world has made the Solimões River and its connection with other rivers a route for the transport of drugs from Peru, Bolivia and Colombia, and which are destined for both the Brazilian and international market.

Despite the described scenario, which associates the Amazon region with the global market of drugs, and which certainly has had repercussions throughout Brazil, the difference observed in the rural and adjacent intermediary municipalities in the region draws attention in the data analyzed here, as shown in Table 2 and Graph 7, below.

### TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of municipality</th>
<th>Legal Amazon</th>
<th>Brazil - except Legal Amazon</th>
<th>Total Brazil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absolute numbers</td>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>Absolute numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjacent Rural</td>
<td>1,102</td>
<td>1,198</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote Rural</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjacent Intermediary</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote Intermediary</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>7,591</td>
<td>5,782</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,199</td>
<td>8,727</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: State Departments of Public Security and/or Social Defense; IBGE; Brazilian Forum of Public Security.
The data indicates that 76.4% of murders in Brazil occur in urban areas, and it is precisely in the cities with urban characteristics that there was a sharp drop between 2018 and 2020. When we verify the intentional violent deaths, however, the Amazon context is detached from the nationally verified trend. In the rest of the country, there is a reduction of murders in the municipalities classified as adjacent rural (-6.2%), in remote rural areas (-0.6%) and in adjacent intermediary areas (-8.5%). When we look at the Amazon region, however, this trend is reversed. The rate of intentional violent deaths grew 7.2% in adjacent rural municipalities, 13.3% in remote rural areas and 15.1% in adjacent intermediary areas, in addition to an 11.7% growth in remote intermediary areas.
The comparison of the rates of intentional violent deaths shows that, despite the serious situation of violence recorded in the country, the rates for all the types of municipalities, according to the IBGE classification, are higher in the Amazon region in 2020. The average rate of lethal violence in the region is 40.8% higher than the rate seen in other Brazilian municipalities (excluding the Legal Amazon).

The comparison of the rates of intentional violent death for 2018 and 2020 indicates that, with the reduction of the lethal violence observed in the urban municipalities, the municipalities considered as adjacent intermediaries concentrated, in 2020, the highest death rates. Added to this scenario is the high death rate in the rural and remote intermediary territories, which are almost equal to the urban areas. This seems to corroborate the arguments presented in the latest report of the CPT, which points to 2020 as the year with the highest number of conflicts in the countryside since 1985. According to the CPT, there was an 8% growth in the number of conflicts in the countryside throughout the country in 2020, when compared with 2019. The report also shows that the Legal Amazon region concentrated 62.4% of the land conflicts in Brazil in 2020.

In order to analyze the violent deaths in the light of the phenomenon of the deforestation, we used the classification proposed by Imazon to divide the areas of the municipalities of the region into four categories and, with this, to overlap analytical layers to the debate that is already being carried out by the socioenvironmental field in the country. For Imazon, the Amazon can be classified into four major areas: 1) the “non-forest” areas, which are those regions covered by cerrados and fields, where the main activities are extensive cattle breeding and agriculture; 2) the “deforested” areas, which are the regions that were covered by forests, but already have more than 70% of their area deforested; 3) the “under pressure” regions, which are those that are in the new frontiers of the deforestation and occupation of the Amazon and, therefore, are areas with the greatest current risk of deforestation. 4) Finally, the “forest” areas, which are the most conserved regions, with only 5% of the area deforested (CELENTANO, VERÍSSIMO, 2007).59

Source: State Departments of Public Security and/or Social Defense; IBGE; Brazilian Forum of Public Security.

MAP 14
Intentional violent deaths (2020), occupation zones (2020) and increment of deforestation (2018-2020) in the Legal Amazon

Source: Mapping of the Violence in the Amazon Region. FBSP, 2021. Imazon. INPE

The image that superimposes the violent deaths and deforestation points to some coincidence in the areas of concentration of both the phenomena. The same occurs when relating the occupation zones and deforestation. In addition to a higher concentration of crimes in the “deforested” and “under pressure” areas, it can be verified that, in the locations where the deforestation advances into the forest area, there is also a higher incidence of deaths.

GRAPH 10
Proportion of intentional violent deaths, by occupation zone, 2018 and 2020

Source: Mapping of the Violence in the Amazon Region. FBSP, 2021. Imazon.
By classifying deaths by occupation zone and comparing them with the same distribution in 2018, it can be seen that most of the crimes, in 2020, were concentrated in the areas classified as “deforested” (36%) and “non-forest” (33%). The region with the lowest percentage of deaths is the “under pressure” zone (14%) followed by the “forest” zone (18%).

What the graph demonstrates is that between 2018 and 2020 there was an increase in the percentage of deaths in the “non-forest” (10 percentage points (p.p.) more), “under pressure” (2 p.p. more) and “forest” (2 p.p. more) zones and a reduction in the share of the “deforested” zone (5 p.p. less).

It is possible to check the confirmation of the visual impression created by the data plotted on the map. In other words, the deforestation advancing in “under pressure” and “forest” areas results in an increase in violence.

GRAPH 11
Rate of IVD per 100,000 inhabitants, by occupation zone of Imazon (2020)

Source: Mapping of the Violence in the Amazon Region. FBSP, 2021. Imazon.

In 2020, when comparing the rates of Intentional Violent Deaths by occupation zones, it was seen that the group of municipalities with the highest rates are those under pressure from deforestation (37.1 per 100,000 inhabitants), in second place are the deforested municipalities (34.6), followed by the non-forest municipalities with a rate of 29.7, and, finally, the forest municipalities have the lowest rate of violent deaths, with 24.9 per 100,000. Similarly, an original study produced by Amazon 2030 “Illegality and Violence in the Amazon,” obtained exclusively by the Revista Piauí, pointed out that from 1999 to 2019, the municipalities with less than 100,000 inhabitants from the region had higher rates of violence in comparison to other Brazilian municipalities of the same size. A total of 12,610 more homicides were estimated in the region.

The study also concluded that the municipalities affected by the activities of land grabbing and the extraction of timber and gold are responsible for 70% of this excess of violence. According to the collected data, from 2015 onwards, however, there was a generalization of violence in the region, with the expansion of the international drug trafficking operations in the region being mainly responsible, combined with the occurrence of other unlawful actions, as also highlighted in this document.

Therefore, what can be ascertained is that the failing to curb land grabbing, or the weakening of the monitoring mechanisms for the environmental crimes involving the illegal extraction of timber or gold, have a direct influence on the possibilities of the increasing levels of violence in the region. Part of the process of exploiting the illegal land use involves threatening, injuring or even murdering the population who live in the desired territory, especially indigenous people. In the next section, we present how the institutional structure of the security in the region is complied with, so that some possible solutions can be indicated in terms of greater coordination between the agencies in order to improve the scenario of violence in the Amazon.
Several security, defense and justice institutions, at the federal and state levels, operate in the Legal Amazon region: Armed Forces, Federal Police and Federal Highway Police, Civil Police, Technical Experts, Military Police and Fire Departments, the Prosecution Office and the Courts of Justice. Furthermore, the operation must be considered of the inspection bodies that also end up working indirectly in areas that affect the public security, such as Funai and ICMBio. The complaints verified by Funai, for example, are sent to the other inspection bodies, such as the Federal Police, the Armed Forces and the Federal Prosecution Office.
The geographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the Amazon, as observed in previous chapters, favor the most varied forms of violence and criminality, ranging from drug trafficking to environmental crimes. Some of these factors are the territorial extension of the region, which occupies 59% of the Brazilian territory, its forest and its navigable rivers, which connect Brazil to the neighboring countries, and the vulnerability of riverside communities, the remaining quilombola people and the indigenous communities.

In this complex context, the formulation of policies to confront the environmental crimes, the trafficking and the lethal violence requires an integrated operation by the institutions that, at the same time, establishes a dialogue with the people of the Amazon. The formulation, the implementation and the success of these strategies require, in advance, that the security and defense institutions operating in the region are well structured internally and coordinated with each other. With this scenario in mind, the following sections seek to design a perspective of the institutional structure of the public security in the Amazon region.

**Armed Forces and national defense**

The following map highlights the military bases of the Army that are spatially distributed throughout the states of the Legal Amazon, in addition to the three regional surveillance centers of the Amazon Surveillance System (SIVAM). It can be seen that the military bases are more concentrated in Acre, on the border with Peru, in Rondônia, on the border with Bolivia and in Roraima, on the border with the Guyanas and in the center of the state. There are also bases distributed close to the rivers and in the state capitals, totaling 51 operational bases of the Army in the Legal Amazon. This number turns out to be insufficient to meet with the demands of the public security and defense in the region. There is also surveillance through SIVAM bases distributed in Belém, Manaus and on the border of Amazonas with Rondônia.
The following map highlights the operational bases for the control of the airspace in the Legal Amazon, whose distribution has the following configuration: telecommunications units, with greater concentration in Amazonas and in Pará; military air force commands, based in Belém and Manaus; transportable surveillance units in Acre (Cruzeiro do Sul), Amazonas (Tefé), Mato Grosso (Sinop) and Rondônia (Guajará Mirim); and surveillance units, mainly located in Pará and Amazonas, monitored by the Air Force Military Command and its surveillance unit in Brasília.
In the context of the Legal Amazon, it is important that the Armed Forces can rely on coordinated actions, working together with IBAMA, ICMBio, the Federal Police, the Civil Police and the Military Police of each state in the region. The following maps indicate the control bases of the Brazilian Navy in the Amazon and the control bases of the public security and management of the territory. A greater number of Navy bases in the rivers of the Amazon can be observed, with a greater presence on the river that bears the same name as the state. The second map indicates the superintendencies of the Federal Police, IBAMA, ICMBIO, IBAMA and the stations of the Federal Police in the Amazon region.
MAP 17
Control bases of the Brazilian Navy in the Amazon

Key
- Navy bases in municipal headquarters
- State limits
- Water mass
- Legal Amazon
- Countries

Map references
- System of geographic coordinates Lat/Long
- Datum: SIRGAS, 2009
- Source: IBGE, 2021; BRASIL, 2020; IBAMA, 2020; FUNAI, 2020
- Journalistic sources: SABINO, T. A. G; FERREIRA, W. M.
- Map organization: COUTO, A. O. C
- Date: September 2021

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- Research project: Mapping of Violence in the Amazon Region

MAP 18
Control bases of public security and management of the territory


Map references
System of geographic coordinates Lat/Long
Datum: SIRGAS, 2000
Source: IBGE, 2021; BRASIL, 2020; IBAMA 2020;
FUNAI, 2020
Journalistic sources
Map preparation: SABINO, T. A.G; FERREIRA, W. M
Map organization: COUTO, A. O. C
Date: September 2021
One of the main operating strategies by the federal government in the Amazon is the use of the National Force of Public Security. The next map demonstrates in which municipalities the operations are concentrated, by size of the manpower. It is worth noting that, for this analysis, only the “environmental” and “indigenous” operations were selected. They are the ones that deal directly with the fight against the environmental crimes and the protection of the indigenous lands.
MAP 19
Active operations of the National Force of Public Security in 2020, by size of the manpower, by occupation zones (2020) and increment of the deforestation (2018-2020)

The map demonstrates that most of the operations are concentrated in areas considered to be under pressure from deforestation. The area under pressure that advances through Roraima, however, did not have any operations in progress in 2020. In the forest areas, where the deforestation begins to advance, there were practically no operations and those that took place were the least effective ones. The selected municipalities, which have high rates of violent deaths and are in rural, forest or under pressure areas, also do not coincide with those where there are operations by the National Force. In other words, there is no overlap between the territories where the National Force has been involved in environmental and indigenous operations and the territories that have suffered the most with the advance of the deforestation and the violence.
As the previous map indicates, the municipality where the operation of the FNSP and the pressure of deforestation coincide is Novo Progresso, in Pará. The operation that takes place there is of an environmental nature and focuses on confronting the crimes of the illegal extraction of timber and illegal artisanal mining. However, one of the current criticisms is that the National Force of Public Security, as well as the Armed Forces, are temporary occupation forces and they do not always know the territories and the dynamics that develop in them. The cost of these operations could be allocated to programs of cooperation between state and federal police and, above all, to the strengthening of the capacity of enforcement and coordination of local agencies of public security, criminal prosecution, command and control.

In general, the operations by the National Force of Public Security and/or the Guarantee of Law and Order – GLO appear to have little effect on the indices of lethal violence in the region and, therefore, on the reversal of the scenario of the crimes committed in its interior and, therefore, in the forest. Between 2018 and 2021, there were 108 FNSP operations in the Amazon, 41 of which were in Pará. In the whole of Brazil, of 246 FNSP operations in the same period, only 31 supported border actions and/or involved IBAMA, FUNAI and ICMBio.

Between 1992 and 2021, there were 144 GLO operations involving the Armed Forces nationwide. Between 2018 and 2019, there were 5 exclusive GLO operations in the Amazon, including the Verde Brasil I operation, which cost R$ 124.5 million to the federal coffers. If we add to this amount to the cost of the Verde Brasil II and the Samaúma operations, which took place in 2020 and 2021, and according
to a recent report\textsuperscript{61} cost R$ 460 million, the federal government has spent R$ 584.5 million during the administration of Jair Bolsonaro with GLO operations in the Amazon and yet failed to reduce the violence and the environmental crimes or to retake territories from the factions in the remote forest areas.

\textbf{Federal Highway Police (PRF)}\textsuperscript{62}

As observed earlier, the highways are important routes for drug trafficking in the Legal Amazon, especially in the states of Amapá, Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia and Tocantins. In this context, the importance of the Federal Highway Police in combating the trafficking in the region is evident. According to data obtained from the Transparency Portal of the Office of the Federal Comptroller General, there were about 10,964 Federal Highway Police on active duty in the country in February 2021. Of these, 1,537 worked in the states of the Legal Amazon. Considering the road network in the region, each police officer would be covering, on average, 178 km of highways, reaching 372 km in Tocantins and 289 km in Maranhão. This is without considering the work schedules, which would greatly increase the area covered by each PRF during the work shift.

\textbf{TABLE 3}

Federal Highway Police, by UF of capacity (Brazil, UFs and Legal Amazon - 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brazil, UFs and Legal Amazon</th>
<th>Federal Highway Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amapá</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maranhão</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mato Grosso</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pará</td>
<td>339\textsuperscript{(1)}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rondônia</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roraima</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tocantins</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Amazon</td>
<td>1,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textbf{Brazil}</td>
<td>\textbf{10,935}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{(1)} According to the field work of the project carried out in Pará, this number is slightly higher and may include teams sent in task forces or special missions.


\textsuperscript{62} The report does not include an analysis of the manpower of the Federal Highway Police, because no disaggregated information was obtained. During the field interviews of the project, especially in Amazonas, the difficulty of the allocation and management of personnel in the PF units located outside of the capitals of the region became clear. The possible work of the PF is that of special operations, with the transport of teams from other regions of the country. However, in the daily routine of the forest, the available teams are insufficient. In other words, from what has been described to us, there would be about 80 federal police officers stationed throughout the whole of Amazonas, for example. This, in practice, means that the PF has around 20 police officers on each shift every day, making it dependent on the manpower mobilized by the task forces and special operations.
As an example of the operation of the PRF in the region, on a visit to the Federal Highway Police headquarters in Belém (PA), in September 2021, more detailed information was given to the project team with respect to the operation of the PRF in the state. The information reinforces the notion of insufficient manpower for the region. Furthermore, the Federal Highway Police who were interviewed highlighted that significant specialization is required so that the professionals are capable of identifying, for example, illegal timber. However, the training course is only three months long and does not include this specialization. In terms of manpower, the PRF has almost 400 police officers in activity in Pará, working in 5 operational units.
Therefore, as the police are on a 24/72 hourly shift, the manpower needs to be divided by four to calculate the number of police officers working daily. Given the number of police in administrative posts or on leave, it is estimated that only about 10% of the manpower are in operational service on a daily basis. It is also estimated that a team (a pair) of professionals would cover around 200 km each day in the state. Generally, between 30 and 35 police work daily at the precincts across the state, which is a derisory number for the demands of the region. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the precincts of the PRF in Pará cover very different crimes.

In the 1st precinct, which covers the area of the metropolitan region of Belém, the main confronted problems are related to road safety, assaults, robberies and thefts. Meanwhile, in the interior of the state, the most recurrent crimes have other characteristics and are more related to environmental crimes and trafficking. In the 2nd precinct of the PRF, in Ipixuna, contrabanded cigarettes and sneakers are very common on the BR 010, which goes from Belém to Brasília. According to the police officers, while previously it was common for them to seize illegally extracted raw wood and charcoal in the region of the 2nd precinct, currently only sawn timber has been more frequent. Also, in the region covered by the 2nd precinct, is the port of Miritinguba, which connects to the BR 163. At this port, about half of the soy production of Mato Grosso is shipped, which makes any inspection at the time of the harvest practically impossible, when thousands of trucks are on the road every day filled with soy.

The 3rd precinct covers the region of Marabá, where there is illegal mining. The 4th precinct, in turn, is in Altamira, which is the largest municipality in territorial extension in the country. The illegal extraction of timber is the most frequent offense, but the largest challenge is the distance between the precinct, in the central region of the city, and the area that is deforested to extract timber, which is about a thousand kilometers away. The 5th precinct, in Santarém, is actually closer to the region of the timber extraction than the center of Altamira.

Finally, the 5th precinct is located in Santarém, where the smuggling of animals and fish is quite common. The precinct includes the region of Jacareacanga, where the Amana national forest is located, which is of strategic importance because of its proximity to Rondônia and Bolivia. It also covers the BR 230, also known as the Trans-Amazonian Highway, in addition to the municipality of Itaituba, where illegal logging is frequent in indigenous lands.
Civil Police (PC) and Military Police (PM)

If the structures of the Armed Forces, the National Force of Public Security, the Federal Police and the Federal Highway Police are insufficient to reduce the environmental and lethal crimes in the Legal Amazon, the finding is no different in relation to the state security institutions. The region is marked by the absence of a robust institutional structure, and by deficiencies in the investigation and inspection, resulting from the weakness of the Civil Police and the Military Police. Furthermore, the lack of coordination between the state police and the federal institutions of security harms the consolidation of effective policies to combat the violence and environmental crimes in the region.

In order to illustrate the productivity of the police in the region, we compared the seizure rates of narcotics in the states of the Amazon with the national seizure rate. According to the 15th Brazilian Yearbook of Public Security, the registration rates for reports of drug trafficking in 8 of the 9 states of the Amazon are lower than the national average. The national rate for the registration of police reports of drug trafficking is, on average, 89.9 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. In the region, only Mato Grosso had a higher rate than the national one. Most states in the region are among those with the lowest rates in the country. Because these registrations indicate a significant amount about the productivity of the police, and given the identified drug trafficking routes, the data reveals a dissociation between the police activity and the incidence of these crimes in the territory.

### TABLE 4
Registrations of trafficking of narcotics, by absolute numbers and rate per 100,000 inhabitants, Brazil and UF of the Legal Amazon, 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brazil and Federation Units</th>
<th>Trafficking of Narcotics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Absolutes Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>190,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amapá</td>
<td>724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>1,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maranhão</td>
<td>1,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mato Grosso</td>
<td>4,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pará</td>
<td>5,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rondônia</td>
<td>1,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roraima</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tocantins</strong></td>
<td><strong>846</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In absolute numbers, the states of the Legal Amazon also have police manpower below most of the Brazilian Federation Units. Of the six Brazilian states with police and firefighter manpower that totals less than 10,000, four are in the Amazon. All the nine states in the region have a Civil Police force with fewer than 3,000 personnel. Considering the work schedules of the public security professionals, the table below estimates the numbers of Civil Police and Military Police available per shift in the region. In Roraima and Acre, for example, the number of Civil Police per shift is approximately 128 and 232 professionals, respectively. Also, in these two states, a detailed look shows that the number of police chiefs working in each state per shift is only 14 in Roraima and 20 in Acre.

TABLE 5
Manpower on active duty and estimated by work shift of the Civil Police and Military Police, UF of the Legal Amazon, 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brazil and Federation Units</th>
<th>Military Police</th>
<th>Civil Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Per Shift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>2,327</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amapá</td>
<td>3,121</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>8,704</td>
<td>2,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maranhão</td>
<td>10,898</td>
<td>2,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mato Grosso</td>
<td>6,855</td>
<td>1,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pará</td>
<td>15,337</td>
<td>3,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piauí</td>
<td>5,645</td>
<td>1,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rondônia</td>
<td>5,173</td>
<td>1,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roraima</td>
<td>1,552</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tocantins</td>
<td>2,926</td>
<td>732</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Despite this, it is possible to ascertain that the states of the Legal Amazon have, on average, higher numbers of police officers per thousand inhabitants in comparison with the rest of the country. The only two exceptions are Pará and Maranhão, which have rates of police officers per thousand inhabitants slightly below the national rate.
Despite having more police per inhabitant than the rest of the country, five of the nine states of the Legal Amazon have the smallest populations in Brazil (RR, AP, AC, TO and RO), which has an impact on the rate of police officers per inhabitant. In addition to being sparsely populated, the states of the region also have few inhabitants, so that all, with the exception of Maranhão, are among the states with the lowest rates of population per km² in the country. Amazonas, for example, is the state with the largest territorial extension in the country, as well as the one with the smallest population per km² (2.7 people/km²). While Brazil has an average of 24.9 inhabitants per km², in the Legal Amazon this rate is only 5.8 people per km².
The disparity between the territorial extension and population is also reflected in the manpower of the police officers in the region, so that the area covered by a police officer is about 4 times greater in the states of the Legal Amazon in comparison to Brazil. While in Brazil the rate is one police officer for every 15 km², in the Amazon region there is one police officer for every 61 km². This rate seems to point to a lower capacity for investigation and inspection by the Civil Police and the Military Police, especially in the less inhabited regions of the states.

**GRAPH 15**

Area (km²) by police officer, by corporations and total (Brazil, Legal Amazon and UFs - 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Civil Police and Technicians</th>
<th>Military Police and Fire Departments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maranhão</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>161.8</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amapá</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>127.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rondônia</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>136.3</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>169.6</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tocantins</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>180.3</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pará</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>375.7</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mato Grosso</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>274.7</td>
<td>110.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roraima</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>393.7</td>
<td>108.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>132.1</td>
<td>775.3</td>
<td>159.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Amazon</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>306.4</td>
<td>76.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics; Brazilian Forum of Public Security.
In fact, there is a concentration of the manpower of the state police in the capitals and metropolitan regions of the states of the Amazon, as indicated in the following graphs. At the same time, as the second Chapter of this report points out, the rural and intermediary municipalities, located mainly in the interior of the states, were those that had an increase in the rates of violent deaths between 2018 and 2020. It is also in these municipalities that deforestation has advanced. Despite this, it is possible to observe that only 41% of the manpower of the Military Police of the states of the Legal Amazon is based in the municipalities of the interior. The percentage of police officers in the interior is less than 30% in states such as Roraima, Amazonas, Amapá and Acre. As for the Civil Police, the concentration of the manpower in the interior is 44% in the region as a whole, with 22% and 23% in Roraima and Acre,

**GRAPH 16**

Proportion of the manpower on active duty of the Military Police, by region  
(Brazil, Legal Amazon and UFs - 2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Capital and metropolitan region</th>
<th>Interior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Amazon</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Profile Research of the Institutions of Public Security (base year 2019); Ministry of Justice and Public Security.

**GRAPH 17**

Proportion of the manpower on active duty of the Civil Police, by region  
(Brazil, Legal Amazon and UFs - 2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Capital and metropolitan region</th>
<th>Interior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Amazon</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Profile Research of the Institutions of Public Security (base year 2019); Ministry of Justice and Public Security.
Furthermore, according to the Profile Research of the Institutions of Public Security (base year 2019), produced by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, three of the nine states of the Legal Amazon do not have specialized environmental units of the Military Police in the interior (Acre, Amazonas and Roraima). Also, in relation to the PMs, only five states include the subject of environmental policing, addressing law and environmental crimes, in their continuous training programs (Amazonas, Amapá, Maranhão, Mato Grosso and Pará). In the other states, the environmental policing is not part of the continuous training (Rondônia and Tocantins), or the training program does not even exist (Acre and Roraima). In the Civil Police, the situation is even more serious: only the state of Amazonas included environmental policing as part of the program of its continuous training.

The insufficient and apparently unevenly distributed manpower in the territory, without concentrating on the regions where the homicides and the deforestation are advancing, as well as the insignificant training of the state security professionals with respect to environmental crimes, are elements that contribute to the weakening of the operation of the police officers in the Legal Amazon region. Added to this is the perception that the public agents are very often actual players in the very crimes they should be fighting. These findings reinforce not only the need to strengthen the state institutions of public security, but also the initiatives to inspect and control the police activity.

It is in this context that initiatives such as the Integrated Centers of Command and Control (CICC) have gained strength. In the Centers, social defense institutions are integrated - Armed Forces, Military Police and Civil Police - with the objective of operating in a coordinated manner, thereby facilitating a systemic view of a given context and decision-making. At the same time, the institutions integrated in the Center in a certain way compete with each other, which can promote the control of one institution by the other. Currently, states in the region such as Amazonas, Mato Grosso, Pará and Rondônia have the CICC, many of them being inaugurated in 2021.

In Acre, the creation is planned of the Integrated Center of Command and Control of the Border, located in Cruzeiro do Sul. The Center will integrate federal and state institutions of defense and security, and will focus on operating against drug trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling and illegal immigration. In this regard, it is worth highlighting the existence of the Integrated Center for Border Operations that operates on the national level, which is located in Foz do Iguaçu (PR), and is responsible for acting in the control of border crimes in the entire country. The Center is composed of security forces with different levels, seeking to strengthen the integration between the public security agents in the fight against transnational organized crime.

Furthermore, in December 2019, the Integrated Center for Public Security Intelligence – North Region (CIISPR-NORTE) was inaugurated in Manaus. The Center adds to those that are already operating in the other regions of the country and that aim to promote the integration of the intelligence activity of the states. The performance of the activities of the Center is carried out in a partnership between the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJSP) and the state of Amazonas. According to information from the MJSP website, the CIISPR-NORTE is formed by an intelligence professional from each one of the adhering states, a coordinator recruited by the Intelligence Directorate of the Department of Integrated Operations (Seopi/MJSP), a representative from each one of the intelligence agencies of public security of the state of the Amazonas and two analysts who are specialists in activities such as data extraction and business intelligence.

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65 https://agencia.ac.gov.br/acre-sera-o-primeiro-estado-da-regiao-norte-a-implantar-centro-integrado-de-comando-e-controle-de-fronteira/
Be that as it may, the initial analysis of the institutional capacities of the police officers indicates a series of problems in the management of personnel and also in the coordination and integration of the activities between the different agencies, both at the local and interstate levels. During the field work carried out in Manaus, for example, numerous situations were reported that make it difficult for crimes to be recorded officially. Among them, we were informed that a homicide that took place in the city of Lábrea, in the south of Amazonas, will be registered, at best, by the Civil Police of Rondônia, whose access to the city is easier than that of the Civil Police teams from Amazonas, given the time and distances that need to be travelled by boat or plane. Because the Rondônia PC has no legal jurisdiction in Amazonas and the local PC has no connections or data systems, this often means there is no reliable data about the scale of the violence in the south of Amazonas. In an approximate estimation, the interviewed source said that there are about three times more violent deaths in the region than are effectively registered by official statistics.

To conclude, this report does not exhaust all the data or the possibilities of the cross-referencing of the variables, but quite the opposite. In fact, it serves as a significant initial stage, but, by definition, incomplete, insofar as it confirms the overlapping of different types of violence and unlawful actions. Above all, it is that the socioenvironmental debate needs to incorporate public security, understood as a fundamental right that is established in our constitutional order, in the list of variables that make up the construction of a project of a green economy and sovereignty. Therefore, more than just scrutinizing data and secondary sources, the Brazilian Forum of Public Security understands that this material is, together with the already published executive summary, sufficient to serve as a starting point for a broad dialogue with the sectors directly involved in the region. The assumption is that this study is an applied effort and that it aims to open doors based on the cross-referencing of the evidence in addition to causing a shift in the debate about the connections between public security, national sovereignty and the green economy of the Amazon. After all, in each of these dimensions, there is an accumulation of knowledge, data and different institutional and political arrangements. The issue, therefore, is to exploit the convergences that update the governance of the region in order to induce social justice, reduce violence and to preserve the forest.
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